Three essays in applied market design by Fung, Juan Francisco
c© 2016 Juan Fung
THREE ESSAYS IN APPLIED MARKET DESIGN
BY
JUAN FUNG
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2016
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Steven R. Williams, Chair
Professor Daniel Bernhardt
Professor Daniel McMillen
Professor Martin Perry
Abstract
The market design approach to economics recognizes that markets do not
arise naturally but are rather an amalgamation of various rules and norms.
From this perspective, an economist can reverse engineer the rules that are
consequential to a functioning market and evaluate the effects of those rules
on market outcomes, with an eye toward potentially re-engineering certain
components to achieve some objective. In this thesis, I present three market
settings inspired by real-world applications, viewed broadly from the lens of
market design.
The first chapter, joint work with Chia-Ling Hsu, explores the conse-
quences of various market details on equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, we
consider a situation in which a matching problem between two sets of agents
is solved by a platform serving as an intermediary. For instance, an artist
who wants to find donors and a backer who wants to find artists to support
can find each other on a crowdfunding platform like Kickstarter. Existing
models of platform markets restrict agent heterogeneity and so the matching
problem is secondary. However, it is possible that different artists target dif-
ferent types of backers and even likely that backers differ in their preferences
for artists. In this chapter, we introduce agent heterogeneity by proposing a
matching model of platform markets. In such markets, stability eliminates
the possibility of an individual or group of agents switching in equilibrium,
thus ensuring successful coordination. The model allows exploration into the
properties of equilibrium with heterogeneous agents, offering a new approach
to studying platform markets.
In the second chapter, I empirically quantify the value of public school
choice. Traditionally, public school assignment is determined by a family’s
residence in the district. An alternative policy is to allow families to apply to
any school in the district. Such school choice programs provide families with
more options, but it is unclear how much families value these options over
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having a guaranteed school. In this chapter, I exploit a natural experiment in
Champaign-Urbana, IL: in 1998, Champaign school district adopted school
choice while the neighboring district of Urbana did not. Using variation in
housing prices in each district, before and after the policy change, I estimate
the marginal willingness to pay for school choice relative to residence-based
assignment. I find that, on average, households are willing to pay between 5-
7% more for school choice relative to residence-based assignment. The results
are robust to regularization and alternative model specifications.
The third chapter, joint work with Blake Riley, is motivated by decentral-
ized matching: the process by which agents find matches on their own. We
show that, without revealing information to a centralized matchmaker and
without coordination, agents can find stable matches on their own. Existing
work on uncoordinated matching, based on the random better reply dynam-
ics of Roth and Vande Vate (1990), shows that agents do find stable matches
but that in the worst case it could take exponentially long. We introduce
a new process that, in various numerical experiments, appears to converge
in polynomial time. The key to our proposal process is mitigating a major
bottleneck in uncoordinated matching: the possibility that an agent is single
for a very long time before finding a match. In the worst case, our process
converges in O(n3) time in moderate sized balanced markets with n agents
on each side. We also consider unblanaced markets, in which there are more
agents on one side of the market. While convergence to stability is not guar-
anteed in polynomial time, we show numerically that typical outcomes of
our proposal process are more egalitarian than stable outcomes. This chap-
ter thus sheds some light on the value of centralizing a matching market, as
opposed to allowing the market to clear on its own.
The common thread in all three chapters is that, while markets should
not be taken as given, it is important to evaluate the relative importance
of particular design elements. The first chapter characterizes equilibrium
outcomes under various designs; the second considers the relative value of
two particular designs; and the third questions the value of designing at all.
In the spirit of market design, each application is driven by actual markets
and a variety of methodologies.
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Chapter 1
Matching in Platform Markets
with Chia-Ling Hsu
1.1 Introduction
Imagine an artist who would like to raise money for a large public exhibition.
How should the artist go about finding backers? He might consider outreach
through local galleries, filing grant applications, or perhaps, if it’s the 16th
century, asking his local monarch. Such fundraising is challenging even for
an established artist. On the other hand, imagine a patron of the arts who
would like to fund a promising new artist. How does this individual find
an artist to fund? For the very few “in the know,” there is a well-informed
art community. However, the art community may not be available to an
“outsider,” nor is it likely to be aware of every new artist.
The preceding scenario presents a matching problem: artists and backers
would like to get together. A solution to this matching problem has emerged
in the form of crowdfunding.1 Platforms such as Kickstarter and IndieGoGo
allow artists to present their fundraising campaign to a wide audience of
potential backers, eliciting donations in exchange for rewards. For example,
the artist might offer each backer an autographed sketch of the exhibition.
If the artist’s campaign is successful, the crowdfunding platform receives a
percentage of the funds raised. In this way, platforms solve the matching
problem between artists and backers.
Existing models of platform markets, however, ignore the matching aspect.
The standard approach focuses on pricing strategies by monopoly platforms
or price competition between competing platforms and the resulting alloca-
tions of agents across platforms; see Rysman (2009) and Wright (2004) for
good overviews. In these models, agent heterogeneity is limited and thus
1Other examples of such markets include Airbnb, matching hosts and travelers, and
Coursera, matching college instructors and students.
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the matching problem is trivial. Platforms set prices and agents choose
platforms, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Such models have provided much in-
sight into platform behavior while taking agent behavior as given. In many
platform markets, this is a close approximation to reality (e.g., ride-sharing
services like Uber, online marketplaces like eBay, and the modern advertis-
ing business as exemplified by Facebook and Google). If, however, agents are
heterogeneous in their preferences for agents on the other side of the market,
as in the matching between artists and backers, then it is natural to ask how
heterogeneity affects market outcomes.
Figure 1.1: Artists and backers choose platforms
a1 a2 a3 a4
b1 b2 b3 b4
i1 i2
Artists
Platforms
Backers
We model platform markets as a matching problem in order to study agent
heterogeneity. In doing so, we address three important questions. The first
is how to model matching in platform markets. Second, in a matching model
of platform markets, what is a reasonable notion of equilibrium? With an
equilibrium concept in hand, we then explore how agent heterogeneity affects
properties of equilibrium.
Our model of matching in platform markets has three important features.
The key feature is that we allow for arbitrary heterogeneity in preferences for
platforms and for other agents. An artist may want to raise money from as
many backers as humanly possible, or he might be targeting a very specific
segment of like-minded patrons. Potential donors are even more likely to
be heterogeneous in how they value artists. In contrast, existing models
of platform markets restrict heterogeneity in preferences for other agents.
Rochet and Tirole (2003) model agents who differ in how they value the
number of agents from the other side, but the identities of the agents do
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not matter. Armstrong (2006) models agents who differ in how they value
joining a platform. Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2006),
and Weyl (2010) combine both types of heterogeneity.
A second feature of our model is that we allow for an arbitrary number
of platforms, but there is no price competition. Thus, we focus on agent
behavior while taking platform behavior as given. In many matching prob-
lems, prices are of second-order importance, in the sense that prices are not
sufficient to clear the market. For instance, Kickstarter takes a 5% cut of
a successful campaign while IndieGoGo only takes 4%. Nevertheless, Kick-
starter is focused on creative projects while IndieGoGo allows for a broader
range of campaigns, such as charities and entrepreneurs. To an artist at-
tempting to reach patrons of the arts, this distinction is likely to matter
more than the price. Rochet and Tirole (2006) model the monopoly case,
while Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Armstrong
(2006) consider both monopoly and duopoly cases. Weyl (2010) also models
a monopoly platform, but the platform chooses participation rates rather
than prices. White and Weyl (2012) extend this to the oilgopoly case. In all
of these models, the focus is on platform behavior.2
Third, we assume single-homing: each agent chooses a single platform. An
artist must have his campaign approved on Kickstarter and, once approved,
must actively engage with potential backers in order to reach his target. In
addition to these costs, an artist is more likely to succeed on a single platform
than by campaigning on many platforms. Backers, on the other hand, do
not pay the platform to contribute. However, once a backer is signed on to
Kickstarter, it is easier both to find additional artists through the platform
and to contribute to those artists as all payment information is already in
the system. The homing decision in existing models is typically exogenous,
as in the classic models of Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole
(2003) and Armstrong (2006).3
We build a model with these features as a special case of the matching
with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005).4 Matching with
2Exceptions include Lee (2014), who models a bargaining game between platforms and
one side of the market, and Ambrus and Argenziano (2009), who model a dynamic game
between platforms and agents. In all of these, heterogeneity is limited to how agents value
the number on the other side.
3Roson (2005) and Jeitschko and Tremblay (2015) endogenize the homing decision.
4In particular, our model is one of unitary many-to-many matching with contracts; see,
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contracts allows for a rich set of potential matching relationships. Agents not
only choose one another but must specify the terms of their relationship. For
example, Alice the Artist sets a funding goal of $10,000, promising Bob the
Backer a signed sketch for his $100 contribution, and sets a 90 day deadline to
complete her project. A contract summarizes this match. Alice can choose to
offer this contract through Kickstarter or through IndieGoGo. At the same
time, backers choose which artists they want to support and the platform
through which they will donate. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2, where the
links represent the contracts.
The natural next question for the model is how to define equilibrium. In
equilibrium, Alice and her potential backers must coordinate successfully on
a single platform through their choices of contracts. The central solution
concept for matching markets is stability: no individual or group of agents
can find a better match. This property is desirable for successful coordination
in platform markets as it eliminates the possibility of individuals or groups of
agents switching platforms. Moreover, stable allocations are guaranteed to
exist under general conditions.5 We thus adopt stability as our equilibrium
concept and show that the structure of stable matching can provide insight
into qualitative features of market structure in platform markets.
Figure 1.2: Artists and backers choose contracts through a platform
a1, i2 a2, i2 a3, i1 a4, i1
b1, i1 b2, i2 b3, i1 b4, i2
Artist-Platform pairs
Backer-Platform pairs
First, we consider properties of equilibrium when contract terms can be
ordered, like membership fees. In particular, contracts offer either a high
for instance, Hatfield and Kominers (2012, 2015); Kominers (2012).
5We assume the standard substitutes condition for preferences, which is roughly that
contracts are not complementary for agents. However, this condition can be relaxed; see
Hatfield and Kominers (2015); Yenmez (2015).
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fee or a low fee, with the low fee preferred to the high fee all else equal.
A well-known property of stable matching is the “opposition of interests:”
there is a stable match that all artists prefer least, and all backers prefer
most, from the set of stable matchings. At this matching, we show that
more artists pay the high fee, and more backers pay the low fee, than at
any other stable matching. This result parallels the “seesaw” (or divide-and-
conquer) principle from the literature on platform markets (Caillaud and
Jullien (2003); Rochet and Tirole (2006)). In that literature, the result is
driven by a platform’s desire to subsidize one side in order to attract the
other. In our model, the result arises from the opposition of interests at
stability: one side compromises in order to match with the other.
Second, we consider conditions under which the market “tips” in favor of
a dominant platform. Market tipping concerns the equilibrium balance of
market power across platforms. The competition for agents often results in
one or a handful of platforms dominating the market.6 We derive results
on market tipping using the structure of stable matching. In particular, we
introduce a condition that allows platforms to be differentiated with respect
to contract terms and thus capture the market. For simplicity, suppose all
backers prefer to fund musical projects over other types of art projects. Under
this condition, agents match assortatively with respect to contract terms. All
backers will sort into one platform to fund musical projects, and all musicians
will sort into the same platform.
Third, we consider the effect of restricting contract terms on outcomes.
In particular, suppose all artists on Kickstarter must not only pay the same
percentage of funds raised, but must also provide the same rewards to back-
ers. Moreover, suppose all backers continue to donate on Kickstarter for
free but must also donate the same amount. While the example is a bit ex-
treme, it is not difficult to imagine regulation in platform markets requiring
such “non-discriminatory” contract terms. Unsurprisingly, this restriction
results in coordination failure: a stable allocation is not guaranteed to exist.
With fully flexible contract terms, Alice the Artist and Bob the Backer can
easily negotiate on a common platform. This essentially removes the plat-
form from the intermediary role as in Figure 1.2.7 With constrained contract
6See Rysman (2009) for a discussion. Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and Weyl and
White (2014) argue that market tipping is a “knife-edge” outcome rather than a generic
property of equilibrium.
7 We adopt the bipartite structure represented by Figure 1.2 as a direct analogue to a
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terms, Alice and Bob cannot negotiate on a common platform because their
contract terms will be constrained by others joining the platform. In essence,
this returns the platform to the intermediary role as in Figure 1.1, breaking
the two-sided structure. We thus propose a constrained version of stability
and show existence under the additional assumption of lexicographic pref-
erences.8 Lexicographic preferences restore the bipartite structure in Figure
1.2: finding backers is of first-order importance to Alice, making negotiations
over contract terms of second-order importance.9 Our proof is constructive,
based on Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)’s cumulative offer algorithm.10
Our matching model offers a complementary approach to analyzing plat-
form markets that allows for fully heterogeneous agents. By focusing on
agents rather than platforms, we can derive qualitative properties of the equi-
librium market structure while abstracting away from price competition. As
Weyl (2010) points out, there is a gulf between the standard platform mar-
kets literature and the “matching design” literature, even though “[t]hese
literatures have much in common.” It is our hope that this paper provides a
first step towards a synthesis of the two approaches.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the matching
model of platform markets. The main results are derived in section 1.3, with
proofs in Appendix A.1. Section 2.5 offers some concluding remarks.
1.2 A matching model of platform markets
In this section, we construct our matching model of platform markets. We
propose stable matching as the natural equilibrium concept: at a stable
match, no individual or group of agents can find a better match. Stability
classical two-sided (platform) market. Nevertheless, the bipartite structure can be relaxed
in matching with contracts; see, for instance, Ostrovsky (2008); Hatfield et al. (2013);
Hatfield and Kominers (2013).
8In our paper, artists are lexicographic in the sense that preferences over backers are of
first-order importance, followed by preferences over platforms and contract terms. How-
ever, if preferences over platforms are of first-order importance, for instance, our results
still hold, so long as all artists are lexicographic in this way.
9Our result is in the spirit of Dutta and Masso´ (1997), who show that when artists
have preferences over the other artists in a match, the two-sided structure is broken and
a matching is not guaranteed to exist. If, however, artists are lexicographic in the sense
that preferences over backers are of first-order importance, then a stable matching exists.
10See So¨nmez (2013) and So¨nmez and Switzer (2013) for recent applications of the
cumulative offer algorithm to real-world market design problems.
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guarantees agents do not switch platforms in equilibrium and is thus essential
for successful coordination in platform markets.
The following notation is used for agents and platforms. Let S = A ∪ B
denote the finite set of agents in the market, and I the finite set of platforms.
Let a, b, and s denote generic agents in the sets A, B, and S, respectively,
and let i denote a generic platform in the set I. Agents from A can only
interact with agents from B through a platform in I.
We assume that each agent can join at most one platform. In the language
of two-sided markets, each side is single-homing. Moreover, an agent can
choose not to participate in any platform. In this case, the agent does not
interact with anyone on the other side.
In addition to choosing matching partners and platforms, agents must
agree to contract terms. When an agent s ∈ S joins a platform, she may
be required to agree to terms in a contract. The terms we consider here
are rather broad. For instance, they may include Alice’s funding target, the
percentage of funds that Alice pays to Kickstarter, and the rewards Alice
promises Bob for a $100 donation. We call ts the contract terms, or simply
terms, imposed on agent s. Let T ≡ TA×TB denote the finite set of possible
terms, where TA are the terms for side A and TB are the terms for side B.
The sets TA and TB may be identical, disjoint, or have elements in common.
We assume that the set of available terms is the same for all platforms.
1.2.1 Platforms as objects of choice
In this subsection, we discuss the role that platforms play in the matching
between agents. Platforms are objects of choice and agents must agree on a
common platform in order to interact (by the single-homing assumption).
We treat platforms as objects of choice: platforms do not have preferences.
Consider an agent’s choice of platform. When an agent chooses a platform
directly, she indirectly chooses agents on the other side. We make this implicit
choice explicit by allowing agents to choose each other. Moreover, the agents
must choose the same platform. Thus, each agent chooses a bundle of agents
from the other side of the market where the bundle is indexed by a platform
and contract terms (e.g., membership fees).
An agent’s choices are embedded in a contract. A contract x associates
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a pair of agents from each side of the market with a platform and, possibly,
contract terms. Formally, let X be the set of all contracts. A typical contract
x ∈ X between agents a ∈ A and b ∈ B takes the form
x = (a, b, i, ta, tb) ∈ X,
where X ≡ S × I × T .
Thus, we are in a many-to-many matching with contracts setting. The
following notation is standard in matching with contracts. For a contract
x ∈ X, let xA ∈ A denote the side A agent, xB ∈ B denote the side B agent,
xI ∈ I denote the platform associated with contract x, and xT = (xTA , xTB) ∈
TA × TB denote the pair of terms associated with contract x. Agents may
sign any number of contracts in general but may not sign multiple contracts
with the same agent. Kominers (2012) calls such environments unitary.
Moreover, agents are free to choose an outside option instead of joining any
platform, represented by the null contract, ∅.
The following notation will also be useful. For a given set of contracts
Z ⊆ X, let Za ⊆ Z denote the contracts in Z associated with agent a ∈ A.
Analogous definitions hold for Zb ⊆ Z and Zi ⊆ Z. Also, let ZA ⊆ A
denote the set of side A agents associated with Z. Analogous definitions
hold for ZB ⊆ B,ZI ⊆ I, and ZT = ZTA ×ZTB ⊆ TA × TB. Finally, we write
(Za)B ⊆ B to indicate the side B agents with contracts in Za. A similar
definition applies for (Za)I ⊆ I, (Za)T ⊆ TA × TB, and so on.
We define feasibility with respect to the unitary and single-homing con-
ditions. Consider an agent a ∈ A. If a signs multiple contracts then by
single-homing, the platforms must be the same across all those contracts.
Moreover, each contract must represent a partnership with a unique agent
on the other side.
Formally, a set of contracts Z ⊆ X is feasible if
1. ∀a ∈ A: (i) zB = z′B ⇒ z = z′,∀z, z′ ∈ Za, and (ii) (Za)I = {ia}
2. ∀b ∈ B: (i) zA = z′A ⇒ z = z′,∀z, z′ ∈ Zb, and (ii) (Zb)I = {ib}
In other words, Z is feasible if each agent with contracts in Z holds contracts
that are (i) unitary and (ii) single-homing.
To illustrate feasibility, consider the following simple example. Let agent
a ∈ A and suppose B = {b1, b2}, I = {i1, i2}, and the terms are TA = {tL, tH}
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and TB = ∅. The set Z = {(a, b1, i1, tL), (a, b1, i1, tH)} is not unitary for
any agent but satisfies single-homing for both agents, while the set Z ′ =
{(a, b1, i1, tL), (a, b2, i2, tL)} is unitary for both agents but violates single-
homing for a. On the other hand, the set Z∗ = {(a, b1, i2, tL), (a, b2, i2, tL)}
is feasible.
1.2.2 Preferences of agents
In this subsection, we discuss the assumptions on agent preferences used
throughout the paper. They key assumption is substitutability, which is
central to the existence of stable allocations.
Our construction of preferences is standard. Let Ps denote agent s’s pref-
erence relation over sets of contracts. For ease of analysis, we assume this
ordering is strict. Note that, for an agent s choosing between two contracts,
x and x′, that only differ with respect to the terms for the agent on the other
side, s is likely to be indifferent. In order to have Ps be strict, we assume s
breaks ties between x, x′ arbitrarily. Let P ≡ (Ps)s∈S denote the profile of
strict preferences over sets contracts.
Rather than working with the preference relation directly, it is standard
to focus on an agent’s choices. For a given set of available contracts Z ⊆ X,
agent s’s choice set is defined as
Cs(Z) ≡ {Z ′ ⊆ Z : Z ′PsZ ′′,∀Z ′′ ⊆ Z feasible and Z ′ feasible}
In other words, when agent s ∈ A ∪ B is offered a set of contracts Z, she
chooses the feasible subset from Z that she most prefers with respect to her
preferences, Ps.
It is also useful to define an agent’s non-choices. Agent s’s rejected set
with respect to Z ⊆ X is
Rs(Z) ≡ Z \ Cs(Z).
Let CA(Z) ≡ ∪a∈ACa(Z) and CB(Z) ≡ ∪b∈BCb(Z) denote the set of contracts
from Z chosen by all a ∈ A and all b ∈ B, respectively. The rejected sets for
each side are then RA(Z) ≡ Z \ CA(Z) and RB(Z) ≡ Z \ CB(Z).
In order to guarantee existence of a stable allocation, it is standard in
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the matching literature to assume preferences satisfy a substitutes condition
(Kelso and Crawford (1982)). Preferences over contracts for agent s ∈ S are
substitutable if
Z ⊆ Z ′ ⊆ X ⇒ Rs(Z) ⊆ Rs(Z ′).
In other words, new offers are not influenced by previously rejected offers.
An equivalent definition is that z ∈ Cs(Y ∪{x, z})⇒ z ∈ Cs(Y ∪{z}),∀x, z,
and Y ⊆ X. In other words, the choice of a new contract, z, does not depend
on the availability of another contract, x.
In many matching problems, it is natural for agents to exhibit some sort of
monotonicity with respect to match offers. Following Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005) for many-to-one matching markets and Hatfield and Kominers (2015)
for many-to-many matching markets, we say that preferences satisfy the law
of aggregate demand, if for agent s ∈ S, and X ′ ⊆ X ′′ ⊆ X, we have
|Cs(X ′)| ≤ |Cs(X ′′)|. In other words, more contracts are better. Intuitively,
if more contracts become available, agent s demands weakly more contracts.
The law of aggregate demand has a natural interpretation in two-sided mar-
kets: that agents benefit purely by having more agents to interact with. In
section 1.3.2, we introduce an extension of the law of aggregate demand that
is defined only with respect to the subscription terms.
We introduce a class of preferences that is particularly relevant to platform
markets: the class of lexicographic preferences. We say that preferences are
lexicographic if agents consider the desirability of contracts in a particular
order with respect to the components of the contracts: the agents from the
other side, the choice of platform, and the subscription terms. In particular,
we consider an environment where each agent first considers the set of agents
on the other side, followed by the platform, and finally the terms.11
Definition 1.1. Consider an agent a ∈ A. Preferences of a are lexico-
graphic if whenever any of the following conditions hold,
1. B1 = (Y
a
1 )B = (Y˜
a
1 )B 6= (Y a2 )B = (Y˜ a2 )B = B2,
2. B1 = B2 and i1 = (Y
a
1 )I = (Y˜
a
1 )I 6= (Y a2 )I = (Y˜ a2 )I = i2,
3. (B1, i1) = (B2, i2) and t1 = (Y
a
1 )T = (Y˜
a
1 )T 6= (Y a2 )T = (Y˜ a2 )T = t2.
11Our results also hold if we define the lexicographic ordering with platforms as most
important, followed by the agents from the other side, and finally the contract terms.
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for any sets Y1, Y2, Y˜1, Y˜2 ⊆ X, then
Ca(Y1 ∪ Y2) = Y1 ⇒ Ca(Y˜1 ∪ Y˜2) = Y˜1. (1.1)
Moreover, for any Yˆ ⊆ X such that (Yˆ a)B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ),
Ca(Yˆ )B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ)⇒ Ca(Y )B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ), ∀Y ⊆ X such that (Y a)B,I = (Bˆ, iˆ).
(1.2)
The first equation requires that an agent evaluates any set of contracts
lexicographically, first in terms of the set of agents on the other side, followed
by the platform, and finally by the contract terms. The second equation
requires that if an agent finds a (Bˆ, iˆ)-combination acceptable at some set of
contracts Yˆ , then the agent finds this combination acceptable at any set of
contracts Y ; that is, at any t ∈ T .
Note that it is possible that Ca(Y1 ∪ Y2) = ∅ in equation (1.1). In partic-
ular, we do not require that every (B′, i′, t′) combination be acceptable to a,
only that any t′ ∈ T is acceptable.
Lexicographic preferences may be relevant in some settings. Consider the
example of crowdfunding. It is easy to imagine backers whose first-order
concern is finding musicians they like, with the crowdfunding platform and
match terms secondary. On the other hand, a rock band might be primarily
concerned with reaching its core fans than with the platform through which
it reaches those fans. Lexicographic preferences play an important role in
section 1.3.3 when stable allocations have an additional constraint.
1.2.3 Stable allocations
A desirable property for successful coordination in equilibrium is that agents
are not constantly switching, be it their platform, subscription terms, or
match partners. Stability captures this very notion: no individual or group of
agents mutually prefers another allocation. Thus, it is a reasonable criterion
for allocations in platform markets.
Formally, an allocation Y ⊆ X is simply a feasible set of contracts.
That is, each agent s ∈ S signs unitary contracts associated with the same
platform. Preferences over allocations correspond directly to the underlying
11
preferences over sets of contracts.
An allocation is stable if there is no unilateral or multilateral switching
by agents. Our notion of stability follows from the notion of weak setwise
stability in the matching with contracts literature (Klaus and Walzl (2009),
Hatfield and Kominers (2015)). Formally, an allocation Y is stable if the
following holds:
1. Individual rationality: Cs(Y ) = Y
s, for s ∈ S.
2. No blocking set of contracts: 6 ∃Y ′ ⊆ X such that Y s ⊆ Cs(Y ∪Y ′),
for all s ∈ (Y )S.
Individual rationality rules out unilateral switching in equilibrium. Indi-
vidual rationality requires that an agent s voluntarily participates in alloca-
tion Y by accepting all available contracts in Y . Intuitively, an agent s who
drops some or all of the contracts in Y s is dissatisfied with some of the agents
on the other side or his platform.
Blocking sets capture multilateral switching. A set Y ′ is a blocking set for
Y if some or all of the contracts in Y are replaced by Y ′ for some group of
agents. Intuitively, agents on opposite sides of a platform mutually agree to
switch to another platform, to update their subscription terms, or to swap
match partners. This cannot occur at a stable allocation.
Substitutes guarantees existence of stable allocations, and the set of stable
allocations has a unique structure:
Result 1.1 (Hatfield and Kominers (2015)). When preferences are substi-
tutable, the set of stable allocations is nonempty and forms a lattice.
The lattice structure implies that there exists a partial ordering over sta-
ble allocations, where stable allocations more preferred by one side are less
preferred by the other side. Moreover, the extreme points of the lattice are
optimal in this sense.
In particular, there exists a stable allocation that side A agents prefer
to all other stable allocations, the A-optimal stable allocation, and this
allocation is the least preferred stable allocation for side B agents, the B-
pessimal stable allocation. Similarly, the most preferred stable allocation
for side B agents, the B-optimal stable allocation, is the least preferred
stable allocation for side A agents, the A-pessimal stable allocation.
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1.2.4 Access versus interaction at stable allocations
It is worth noting that stability does not require that all agents who join
the same platform sign contracts. Thus, Bob is free to join Kickstarter and
donate to Alice without also having to donate to Carol the Composer. Nev-
ertheless, Bob gains access to Carol through his choice of platform without
having to commit to a relationship. This is obviously a desirable feature for
successful coordination and it is consistent with existing models of platform
markets; see Rochet and Tirole (2006); Weyl (2010). In fact, as the following
example illustrates, if we do require that all agents who join the same plat-
form must also interact then a stable allocation may not exist. This is not
surprising since such a requirement essentially forces agents into a match,
and this cannot be stable in general.
Example 1.1. Let A = {a1, a2, a3}, B = {b1, b2}, I = {i}, T = ∅, so that
contracts only specify a platform. Consider the following contracts,
x1 = (a1, b1, i) x2 = (a1, b2, i)
y1 = (a2, b1, i) y2 = (a2, b2, i)
z1 = (a3, b1, i) z2 = (a3, b2, i)
and suppose preferences over sets of these contracts are as follows:
Pa1 : {x1, x2}, {x1}, {x2}
Pa2 : {y1, y2}, {y1}, {y2}
Pa3 : {z1, z2}, {z1}, {z2}
Pb1 : {x1, y1, z1}, {x1, y1}, {x1, z1}, {y1, z1}{x1}, {y1}, {z1}
Pb2 : {x2, y2}, {x2}, {y2}
Note that preferences are substitutable.
The A-optimal stable allocation is Y = {x1, y1, z1, x2, y2}. Note that at
Y , b1 is linked to a1, a2, and a3 through i, while b2 only links to a1 and a2.
However, b2 has access to a3 via platform i. Thus at a stable allocation,
agents may share a platform without actually interacting. See Figure 1.3.
Now, suppose we require full interaction at stable allocations. Then b2
does not want to interact with a3, and so a3 cannot be part of an allocation.
However, a3 and b1 mutually prefer interacting to not interacting, blocking
full-interaction stability.
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Figure 1.3: Access versus Interaction:
b2 has access to a3 but only interacts with a1, a2.
a1, i a2, i a3, i
b1, i b2, i
1.3 Main results: Properties of equilibrium allocations
In this section, we present the main results. We provide conditions under
which qualitative features of the equilibrium platform market structure are
reflected in properties of stable matching. Our results suggest that agent
heterogeneity may be an important component of platform market equilib-
rium.
1.3.1 The seesaw principle reflected in stable matching
In this subsection, we show that the opposition of interests property of stable
allocations implies an analogue of the seesaw principle in platform markets.
The seesaw principle in platform markets is the observation that platforms
may treat each side differently with respect to pricing. Rochet and Tirole
(2006) observe a tendency for all agents on one side to pay the low price
while agents on the other side pay the high price. Consider the example
of crowdfunding. Suppose the only relevant contract terms for artists are
the fees paid to the platform, a high fee and a low fee, and suppose the
only relevant contract terms for backers are the cost to contribute, a high
cost and a low cost.12 The platform might allow backers to donate at the
12We can imagine a setting in which the platform is more of a matchmaker, with agents
arranging terms of their relationship outside of the match. For instance, suppose backers
are indifferent between a fixed number of possible donations and prizes, which are chosen
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low cost, creating a critical mass of potential donors and thus attracting
artists who will happily pay the high fee. In the platform markets literature,
this outcome arises as a result of the platform’s incentives. The intuition is
that platforms may subsidize one side in order to attract the other and thus
capture a larger overall market share. This result is sometimes called the
“seesaw” (or divide-and-conquer) principle.
In Theorem 1.2, we show that a similar phenomenon arises even if we
ignore the platform’s incentives. Suppose the set of subscription terms is
TA = TB = {tL, tH}, where tL < tH . We may interpret such ordered terms
simply as “fees” and assume that all agents prefer low fees tL to high fees tH ,
all else equal. The important point is that the contract terms are ordered.
Theorem 1.2 states that when preferences are substitutable, the number of
side-A agents who sign the low fee tL at the A-optimal stable allocation is
weakly larger than in any other stable allocation. The opposite holds for the
side-B agents: the number of side-B agents who sign the low fee tL at the A-
optimal stable allocation is weakly smaller than in any other stable allocation.
The result is a direct consequence of the opposition of interests property of
stable allocations: the A-optimal stable allocation is the B-pessimal stable
allocation.
Theorem 1.2. Suppose preferences are substitutable. Then at the A-optimal
stable allocation,
1. the number of side-A agents that sign tL-contracts is weakly higher than
at any stable allocation, and
2. the number of side-B agents that sign tH-contracts is weakly higher than
at any stable allocation.
By symmetry, the B-optimal stable allocation has a similar property. The
number of side-A agents that sign tH-contracts is weakly higher at the B-
optimal stable allocation than at any other stable allocation, and so on. The
proof, in Appendix A.1.1, exploits the lattice structure and in particular side
optimality.
In the example of crowdfunding, the result can be interpreted as saying
that at the backer-optimal stable allocation more backers join for free and
more artists pay the high membership fee than at any other stable allocation.
at random by the platform after the agents have been matched.
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While our environment is too simple to reflect reality, this property seems to
be reflected in practice, as donating is always free for backers.
1.3.2 Market tipping under stable allocations
In this section, we ask whether platform markets tip in equilibrium. Market
tipping occurs when agents concentrate on a few platforms, shifting the bal-
ance of market power. We present a condition under which the market tips
toward platforms that are differentiated in the terms they offer.
In some situations, an agent may prefer to join a platform that draws
agents from the other side with similar interests or attributes. Consider
the example of crowdfunding platforms. While IndieGoGo welcomes artists,
entrepreneurs, and charities, Kickstarter’s focus is on creative projects. Kick-
starter’s definition of creative, however, still encompasses a broad range of
categories, from art and music to games and technology.13 A musician look-
ing for backers could also turn to ArtistShare, which is focused exclusively
on musicians.14 If musicians prefer to target music lovers, and music lovers
are only interested in funding musicians, then it is possible that all musicians
and music lovers will join a single platform. In our model, this occurs exactly
when all agents prefer to join platforms that are differentiated with respect
to the contract terms they offer. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that a
single platform dominates the entire market but rather that platforms be-
come niches which capture particular market segments and dominate within
that segment, such as crowdfunding for music.
Formally, let T = TA × TB be general sets of terms as defined in the
beginning of Section 1.2. Thus, we do not assume contract terms are ordered.
However, we will now assume preferences satisfy the following condition.
Definition 1.2. We say that preferences satisfy the law of aggregate de-
mand for similar terms, if for any agent a and contract term ta and two
sets of contracts Y and Y ′, we have the following.
|{x ∈ Y : xTB = ta}| ≥ |{x ∈ Y ′ : xTB = ta}| ⇒ Y RaY ′;
|{x ∈ Y : xTB = ta}| > |{x ∈ Y ′ : xTB = ta}| ⇒ Y PaY ′.
13See https://www.indiegogo.com/explore and https://www.kickstarter.com/discover.
14See http://www.artistshare.com/v4/About.
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Roughly, the condition states that agents match assortatively with respect
to contract terms: musicians prefer Y to Y ′ because it has more donors
willing to fund musical projects. We can define an analogous condition for
backers. Under this condition, we have the following result:
Theorem 1.3. Suppose preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggre-
gate demand for similar terms. Let Y be a stable allocation and consider a
term t ∈ YT . Then all agents with term t are associated with one platform.
The proof is in Appendix A.1.2. Substitutes is needed for existence, while
the second condition guarantees agents sort into differentiated platforms in
equilibrium.
1.3.3 Coordination failure under term-constrained stable
allocations
In this subsection, we consider an environment in which agents must be
treated symmetrically with respect to contract terms. Under this constraint,
agents have limited flexibility in expressing a match relationship and thus
stable allocations may not exist. We provide a remedy to this problem under
the additional condition of lexicographic preferences.
Note that our model allows two artists to join the same crowdfunding plat-
form under different contract terms. This is not problematic when thinking,
for instance, of the rewards Alice offers potential backers versus the rewards
Carol offers. If, however, the only relevant contract term in the model is
the fee Kickstarter charges artists, then in it is difficult to justify Alice and
Carol paying different fees for the same service. In the literature on platform
markets, this would be a case of price discrimination. However, since we
abstract away from price competition we can imagine a scenario in which a
regulator requires that Kickstarter offers all artists the same contract terms.
The example has two important features that distinguish it from the pre-
vious examples. First, there is an additional restriction on an allocation that
requires all artists joining the same platform to offer the same campaign and
pay the same fee. This restriction is likely to result in coordination failure:
it is more difficult for artists to entice backers under limited contract terms.
Thus, a stable allocation is not guaranteed to exist. This occurs because the
constraint on contract terms means artists and backers rely more heavily on
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the platform as an intermediary, since they lack the flexibility to express their
match relationship. With the platform in the intermediary role, we lose the
bipartite structure in Figure 1.2. To the extent that matching each artist-
backer pair is subject to a common object, the platform, we have something
closer to a one-sided (or stable roommates) matching problem. In such prob-
lems, stable matchings are not guaranteed to exist. See Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) for a treatment, as well as Gusfield and Irving (1989) for an in-depth
analysis of the connection to two-sided matching problems.15
Second, note that an artists’ preferences naturally express a lexicographic
order on several components. The most important component in their pref-
erences might be the campaign, embodied in the contract terms. The second
most important component could be the platform, followed by the identities
of the backers on the other side. Note that the lexicographic ordering could
be different. For instance, artists may be most drawn to platforms that allow
them to focus on music lovers, agreeing to whatever terms the platform sets.
In this case, agents are most important, followed by the platform and then
contract terms. If artists have lexicographic preferences, we recover the two-
sided structure: finding backers is the most important consideration, making
it easier to find a match.
Let T = TA×TB be the set of contract terms as in the previous subsection.
We define the notion of a term-constrained stable allocation as follows.
Definition 1.3. A set of contracts Y ⊆ X is term-constrained feasible
if for x, x′ ∈ Y , if xI = x′I then xTA,TB = x′TA,TB . Let X˜ denote the term-
constrained feasible set. An allocation Y is term-constrained stable, if
the following holds:
1. Feasibility: Y ∈ X˜.
2. Individual rationality: Cs(Y ) = Y
s, for s ∈ A ∪B.
3. No feasible blocking set of contracts: 6 ∃Y ′ ∈ X˜, such that Y ′s =
Cs(Y ∪ Y ′), for all s ∈ (Y ′)S.
The requirement of individual rationality is the same, but now we impose
feasibility on both the allocation Y and any potential blocking set Y ’.
15To the extent that the platform is in the center of the graph, as in Figure 1.1, our
problem resembles a three-sided matching problem. However, platforms do not have pref-
erences over either set of agents in our model. In three-sided matching problems, Alkan
(1988) shows that a stable matching may not exist.
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The following result states that a term-constrained stable allocation may
not exist in our general environment.
Theorem 1.4. When preferences are substitutable, the set of term-constrained
stable allocations may be empty.
The proof is by the following example.
Let A = {a1, a2}, B = {b1, b2}, I = {i}, TA = {t1, t2}, and TB = ∅.
Suppose preferences over contracts are as follows:16
Pa1 : {(a1, b1, t1)}, {(a1, b2, t1)}
Pa2 : {(a2, b2, t2)}, {(a2, b1, t2)}
Pb1 : {(a2, b1, t2)}, {(a1, b1, t1)}
Pb2 : {(a1, b2, t1)}, {(a2, b2, t2)}
Note the preferences satisfy substitutes. When agents joining the same side
must share the same terms, there are only four possible feasible and individual
rational allocations, and one can easily check that none of these is stable:
Y1 = {(a2, b1, t2)} → blocked by Y2
Y2 = {(a2, b2, t2)} → blocked by Y3
Y3 = {(a1, b2, t1)} → blocked by Y4
Y4 = {(a1, b1, t1)} → blocked by Y1
Thus, there is no term-constrained stable allocation. It is worth noting that
these preferences also (trivially) satisfy the law of aggregate demand. Intu-
itively, the latter assumption would not help because it makes no demands
on the contract terms.
However, if we allow agents who join the same platform to have different
terms, then there are two (unconstrained) stable allocations:
Y5 = {(a1, b1, t1), (a2, b2, t2)}
Y6 = {(a1, b2, t1), (a2, b1, t2)}
As mentioned above, in the example of crowdfunding, it is possible that
16Since there is one platform and side B agents do not face contract terms, we suppress
the notation of platform i and the term for side B in the listed contracts.
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agents’ preferences express a lexicographic order over several components of
the contract. Other examples include charities, religious organizations, and
professional associations. Under the additional assumption of lexicographic
preferences, we have have the following existence result for term-constrained
stability.
Theorem 1.5. When preferences are substitutable and lexicographic, a term-
constrained stable allocation exists.
The proof, in Appendix A.1.3, is constructive and uses a modified version
of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)’s cumulative offer algorithm.
1.4 Concluding remarks
The main contribution of this paper is a new application of two-sided match-
ing that provides a complementary perspective for analyzing certain platform
markets. Our focus is on agents rather than platforms, and the “microstruc-
ture” of interactions at platforms. We allow agents to have preferences over
the quality of interactions with agents on the other side, and not just the
quantity. The solution concept of stability is a reasonable equilibrium cri-
terion as it eliminates switching. We use the structure of the set of stable
allocations to analyze equilibrium market structure.
As Weyl (2010) points out, there is a gulf between the standard plat-
form (“two-sided”) markets literature, and the two-sided matching (and more
broadly, market design) literature.This paper is a first attempt at bridging
that gap. Several interesting problems are left for future work. The most
straightforward extension is to dispense with the single-homing assumption,
which is not essential to our results. Hatfield and Kominers (2015) relax
unitarity and show that many of the properties of stable allocations hold for
the more general case in which each artist and backer pair may sign multiple
contracts. In our model, this would allow agents to multi-home. Another
extension is the introduction of platform objectives. The simplest way to
do this is to assume platforms have a revenue target, but otherwise have no
preferences over agents. In this setting, more care must be taken in defining
an appropriate solution concept. This is left for future work.
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Chapter 2
Sorting Under Public School Choice
2.1 Introduction
Public school options in the United States have evolved significantly in the
last two decades. Households face a landscape that may include vouchers,
charter schools, and open enrollment. In principle, such policies are meant to
provide households with choices beyond the standard neighborhood school.
However, it is not clear to what extent households value such options over the
traditional form of choice: sorting to secure assignment in a neighborhood
school.
In this paper, I estimate the value for school choice relative to neigh-
borhood assignment. In particular, I exploit a natural experiment in the
twin cities of Champaign-Urbana, Illinois in which households can substitute
between two kinds of public school districts: Urbana offers traditional neigh-
borhood assignment, while Champaign offers open enrollment.1 Data from
before and after the Champaign school district adopted open enrollment pro-
vides variation in housing prices due to sorting. Given observed prices in the
treatment (open enrollment) and control (neighborhood assignment) states,
I estimate the expected marginal willingness to pay for school choice relative
to residence-based assignment in a hedonic regression.
Of course, sorting means that treatment is endogenous: households choose
their school district. I estimate a difference-in-differences model for the hedo-
nic regression, controlling for variation in neighborhood amenities. In partic-
ular, I control for neighborhood school quality and distance to neighborhood
school, as well as home-level observables such as number of bedrooms and
bathrooms. The result of combining causal inference with hedonic regres-
1In what follows, I use school choice to refer exclusively to open enrollment programs
unless otherwise indicated.
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sion is an estimate of the average treatment effect (ATE) which directly
corresponds to the marginal willingness to pay for school choice relative to
residence-based assignment.
I find that, on average, the value for school choice is 5-7% higher than
for neighborhood assignment. That is, households are willing to pay more
for school choice than for a guaranteed neighborhood school. Moreover, the
results are robust to various forms of regularization, including lasso and ridge
regression, as well as alternative mixed-effects specifications.
Single family home sale prices are modeled in a hedonic framework. Rosen
(1974)’s hedonic model provides a theoretical framework for estimating im-
plicit prices of attributes of differentiated goods such as houses. There are
several challenges to a traditional hedonic approach, the most important be-
ing potential bias arising from omitted attributes (for example, curb appeal).
Recent literature has shown that causal inference may yield valid estimates of
implicit prices where a standard approach might fail; see Klaiber and Smith
(2013); Parmeter and Pope (2013) for excellent reviews. The idea is to isolate
the impact of the policy change on prices through the attribute of interest.
Causal inference, of course, is not without its pitfalls. By definition, the
treatment effect is the difference between the price of a home in the treatment
state and the price of a home in the control state. The fundamental problem
of causal inference is that the counterfactual price is unobserved: if a home
sells in the treatment state, then we never observe the price of the home in the
control state. In other words, we only observe one of two potential outcomes.
The unique nature of the quasi-experimental setting in Champaign-Urbana
provides both a reasonable control group, in the sense that there are enough
similarities between both districts as to make them substitutes for households
that can afford to sort, and variation in housing prices from before and after
the policy change in each district.
This paper contributes to an emerging literature on empirical matching
and school choice. A large body of literature on public school choice builds
on the pioneering work of Gale and Shapley (1962) on two-sided matching.
This research program is largely theoretical and focused on how critical design
elements—such as assignment mechanisms, priorities, and quotas—affect the
match between students and schools with respect to efficiency, fairness, and
22
incentives.2 More recently, this literature has inspired an empirical research
program to evaluate the impact of school choice programs used in practice.
Many of these papers leverage the school choice mechanisms themselves to
provide random variation, as summarized in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2015).
Abdulkadirolu et al. (2013) use this approach to estimate the effect of small
high schools on student achievement. Abdulkadirolu et al. (2015) examine
whether centralized design offers welfare improvements over decentralized
assignment. In cases where school choice mechanisms are not strategy-proof,
and thus revealed preference analysis is not reliable, Agarwal and Somaini
(2014) use equilibrium analysis in the spirit of partial identification to recover
preferences from reported rankings.
A separate body of literature, largely independent of the theoretical work
on school choice mechanisms, has investigated the general equilibrium im-
pact of alternative forms of school choice—particularly voucher programs,
reviewed in Epple et al. (2015b), and charter schools, reviewed in Epple et al.
(2015a). Related work by Epple and Romano (2003) compares residence-
based assignment to open enrollment in a general equilibrium framework. In
the conclusion, they directly address the consequences of one district adopt-
ing open enrollment while a neighboring district remains residence-based. In
particular, they provide an example to illustrate how stratification can arise
across school districts in equilibrium. One possibility is that high-income
households relocate to the residence-based district, lowering the tax base
(and hence the quality) of education in the choice district. More recently,
Avery and Pathak (2015) formalize the ideas in this example by modeling the
impact of open enrollment on sorting. They show that higher types indeed
do sort out of school choice districts, which has a negative impact on school
quality in the choice district.3 In a sense, my paper is an attempt to quantify
the impact of such sorting.
A brief history of assignment policy changes in Champaign-Urbana is given
in section 2.2. The empirical framework is presented in section 2.3, including
a description of the data. The main results are presented in section 2.4.
Section 2.5 concludes. All figures and tables are in Appendix B.1 and B.2,
respectively.
2The foundational papers include Abdulkadiroglu and So¨nmez (2003); Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al. (2005c,a); Ergin and So¨nmez (2006). See Abdulkadirog˘lu (2013) for a review.
3In Epple and Romano (2003)’s model, ability is positively correlated with income.
23
2.2 Public school assignment policies in
Champaign-Urbana, IL
Under residence-based assignment, a household’s choice set is typically re-
stricted to its neighborhood school.4 As a result, residence-based assignment
has historically been associated with increased segregation in schools and
across neighborhoods. The major legal challenges to school districts accused
of discrimination stem from post-Brown v. Board of Ed desegregation efforts
that were largely static and unresponsive to sorting and changing demograph-
ics. The idea behind open enrollment is that a household’s choice set includes
all of the schools in the district. The principal goals of such programs are to
increase public school options and to promote diversity.
Open enrollment programs assign students to schools through a mechanism
that elicits each household’s ranking over schools in its choice set. In addition
to preferences, the mechanism also considers each applicant’s priority at any
given school. For example, an applicant with a sibling enrolled at one of its
ranked schools has higher priority at that school. School choice mechanisms
differ in how they incorporate preferences and priorities, and the substantial
theoretical literature reviewed in Section 2.1 investigates properties of such
mechanisms.
In practice, such priorities mean that households remain tied to certain
schools. Thus, it is not obvious a priori if the adoption of school choice
increases or decreases a home’s value. On the one hand, a particular location
in the district no longer guarantees your child a spot at any single school.
On the other hand, your child will have higher priority for any school within
walking distance of your home. Since neighborhood school attendance areas
are typically redrawn to balance the distribution of students across schools,
such walk zone schools may in fact be closer (and generally more preferred)
than a child’s previous neighborhood school. Moreover, it is possible that a
household has multiple walk zone schools in its choice set.
My approach exploits public school assignment policy changes in the cities
of Champaign and Urbana, located in Champaign County, Illinois. The two
cities are adjacent and share the flagship campus of the University of Illinois.
4Exceptions are made when only certain schools offer a program, such as special needs,
English as a second language (ESL), and bilingual programs. Nevertheless, the choice set
for such households is restricted.
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An attractive feature of this setting is that it offers a unique “natural ex-
periment” in a small urban area, without other forms of school choice such
as vouchers and charter schools confounding the effects of open enrollment.
Prior to 1998, both districts offered residence based assingnment. Begin-
ning academic year 1998-99, Champaign’s school district adopted elementary
school choice. Urbana’s school district continues offering residence-based as-
signment to before and after the policy change. Figure B.1 presents a map
of the attendance areas in each school district prior to the policy change.
Complaints alleging discrimination against black students in Champaign’s
school district arose in May of 1996. In September of 1997, the parties agreed
to adopt a form of school choice beginning academic year 1998-99, even as
the complaints gave way to a civil suit. In 1998, Champaign adopted a
“controlled choice” system, which seeks to balance elementary school access
and diversity through the use of race-based quotas. Since adopting school
choice, the Champaign school district closed one elementary school, opened
several others, and re-branded an existing school as a magnet school.
Urbana has maintained a system of neighborhood-based public school as-
signment, with attendance boundaries periodically re-drawn to balance en-
rollment. Beginning academic year 2002-03, Urbana modified its attendance
boundaries for this purpose. Thus, I focus on the period 1996 (the earliest
year for which I have housing data) through 2001. The key policy changes
are summarized in Figure B.4. Following attendance area changes in Urbana,
the choice set for individuals in the control regime changes significantly and
thus we would expect the hedonic price function to adjust as well. Therefore,
I restrict my sample to the period 1996-2001.
While the two cities are far from homogeneous, they share enough similar-
ities to be close substitutes for a large portion of home buyers. In particular,
performance on standardized tests, a popular measure of school quality, is
comparable across the two districts. In Section 2.4.1, I present descriptive
statistics to support this point. More importantly, close proximity means
some families (especially middle to upper middle class) can consider hous-
ing and schooling options in both cities. That is, some families can choose
between school choice and residence-based assignment. It is therefore impor-
tant to evaluate treatment effects conditional on observables, such as the size
of the house.
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2.2.1 How school choice works in Champaign
School choice programs like Champaign’s typically work as follows:
• Each family ranks the schools in the district
• Each school in the district ranks applicants
• A mechanism collects both rankings and computes a match of students
to schools
The details of how each step is implemented vary. In Champaign during the
period 1996-2001, each household was allowed to rank up to three (of eleven)
elementary schools.5
Determining how schools rank applicants is important for public school
choice. Since primary education is considered by many to be a basic right,
public schools are not allowed to subjectively rank applicants. Public schools
do, however, give certain applicants higher priority than others. The two
priority classes used in Champaign are:
• Sibling priority: if a student has a sibling enrolled in a school, then it
is desirable to keep both siblings together;
• Proximity priority: if a student lives within walking distance6 of a
school, then it is desirable to let the student attend a school close to
home.
Mathematically, priorities are like preferences. The key difference is that
priorities are set by the district and thus cannot be manipulated.
The choice of mechanism corresponds to the district’s rules for determining
assignments. These rules have important implications for how a family ranks
schools. In Champaign, like many other choice districts, sibling priority at
a school is generally satisfied. Proximity priority at a school, however, is
only available if an applicant ranks that school first. In the literature, this
mechanism is known as the “Boston mechanism,” since it corresponds to
the school choice program originally used by the Boston Public Schools.7
5Today, households may rank all twelve existing elementary schools.
6A proximity priority school is defined as any school within 1.5 miles of a student’s
home, or else the closest school to a student’s home.
7In fact, Champaign’s school choice mechanism was designed by the same consulting
firm that designed BPS’s mechanism.
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The Boston mechanism creates incentives for applicants to misreport their
preferences over schools; e.g., if my true first choice school is overdemanded,
I would rather not waste my proximity priority on it and may instead rank
another school in my walk zone to which I am more likely to be admitted.
Champaign’s (and Boston’s) school choice program is technically one of
“controlled choice:” assignments are determined subject to satisfying racial
quotas. Operationally, this means the district sets both a floor and a ceiling
for the number of seats it reserves for black applicants. The mechanism fills
open seats first, and the remaining students compete for the reserved seats.
Racial quotas thus represent a third priority class—another way for schools
to objectively rank applicants.8
2.3 Empirical framework
My goal is to estimate the value for public school choice relative to tra-
ditional residence-based assignment. Sorting by households in response to
a policy change—the idea that households “vote with their feet”—reveals
their preferences for the policy. However, directly observing such sorting is
rare in practice. I therefore adopt Rosen (1974)’s hedonic model for housing
prices, which assumes that prices reflect the marginal willingness to pay for
bundled amenities, such as the local public school assignment mechanism.
Unfortunately, estimating these values is difficult in practice, largely due to
unobserved factors that confound observed prices. The key to my approach
is the assumption that, following the policy change, some households can
substitute between either regime. Using housing prices from before and af-
ter public school choice was instituted, in both the treatment and control
regimes, I estimate the casual impact of the policy change in a standard
difference-in-differences model. See Parmeter and Pope (2013) for a review
of hedonic amenity valuation using causal inference.
8Following the 2007 Supreme Court ruling in the Seattle “PICS” case, school districts
were barred from using racial quotas. Thus, in 2009, Champaign moved toward using
quotas based on socio-economic status (SES). Of course, SES is still correlated with race.
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2.3.1 The hedonic price model
The hedonic pricing model provides a general equilibrium framework for mar-
kets with differentiated products, such as houses. The key ingredient is the
hedonic price function, f(z), where z ∈ Rd is a vector of attributes such that
the bundle z completely characterizes the house for sale. Thus, f(z) reflects
the price of the bundle z.
Consumers have utility function
U(x, z; ζ)
where x is a consumption good and the consumer faces budget constraint
w = x + f(z). Note that ζ represents unobserved (to the econometrician)
consumer taste shifters. On the supply side, producers face cost function
C(z,M, η)
where M is the quantity of bundles z produced. Here, η has a similar inter-
pretation as ζ.
Let θ(z;u,w) denote the bid function, which represents a consumer’s will-
ingness to pay for bundle z, holding income w and utility fixed at u. Let
ψ(z; pi) denote a seller’s offer curve, which provides the ask for bundle z,
holding profits fixed at pi. In equilibrium, one can show that
∂f
∂z
=
∂θ
∂z
=
∂ψ
∂z
(2.1)
where the consumer’s first order condition implies
θz ≡ ∂θ
∂z
=
Uz(w − θ, z; ζ)
Ux(w − θ, z; ζ) .
Thus, Rosen’s approach reduces inference on the consumer’s marginal willing-
ness to pay for an amenity to inference on the hedonic gradient. Underlying
the equilibrium analysis are several important assumptions:
Assumption 2.1. Assumptions for equilibrium:
1. Unit demand;
2. Numeraire f(x) = 1;
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3. Interior solution.
The equilibrium condition (2.1) is key to Rosen’s approach, which may
be summarized as follows.9 Suppose we have prices, y, and data zobs ∈ Rk,
which represent the subset of attributes observable to the econometrician.
Then we obtain an estimate of the hedonic price function from a regression
of the form:
y = f(zobs; θ) + 
where the hedonic may be parameterized by some θ. We can then use this to
estimate the gradient of f at zj, i.e., fˆj, for an observed amenity of interest,
zj ∈ zobs. Under the assumptions below, in addition to the assumptions for
equilibrium, this estimate represents the implicit price of zj.
Assumption 2.2. Assumptions for identification:
1. Single market;
2. Stability of f(z) over time;
3. ζ are iid across consumers.
The implicit prices {fˆj}j=1:k provide the value for the observed bundle zobs.
In a potential outcome setting, in which zj represents a policy of interest,
fˆj represents the value for a marginal policy change, say from zj = 0 to
zj = 1, under the above assumptions. See Parmeter and Pope (2013) for
more details.
A fundamental problem with empirical implementation of this approach is
that the hedonic bundle characterizing the house, z, is not fully observed by
the econometrician. The classic example is “curb appeal:” while arguably an
important component of a homebuyer’s decision, it is not tangible much less
observable to an analyst. Unobserved attributes which affect decision making
therefore create an endogeneity problem. One approach to this problem is
to use causal inference, carefully conditioning on observed confounders in a
difference-in-differences model.
9In the literature, this is often referred to as the first stage of Rosen (1974)’s approach.
The second stage involves recovering the marginal willingness to pay function, θz(w, z, ζ),
a much more difficult problem as it requires specification of U(·). See Bartik (1987);
Epple (1987); Ekeland et al. (2002); Heckman et al. (2010); Bishop and Timmins (2015)
for background and various approaches.
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2.4 Main results
In Section 2.2, I claim that Champaign and Urbana share enough similarities
that comparisons are meaningful. In the next subsection, I present descrip-
tive statistics to illustrate similarities in sale prices, housing attributes, and
school quality across the two districts. In subsection 2.4.2, I describe the
model specification and discuss results from various estimates.
2.4.1 Describing the data
Basic property data for Champaign County is available to the public on the
Champaign County Assessor’s website. While the County provides records
of sale date and price for each property, it lacks even basic attribute infor-
mation such as lot size. I construct a more complete data set by combining
County data10 with single-family home sale and attribute data obtained from
both DataQuick and the Multiple Listing Service (MLS).11 Besides sale date
and price, the data includes basic information on the buyer (including loan
amount and the buyer’s address) and attributes of the home (such as lot size
and square feet).12
Figure B.5 presents the density of the log sale price for Champaign and
Urbana, before and after the policy change. While the distributions are not
the same, they do not appear to differ in a meaningful way. In Figure B.6,
the median of the log sale price is plotted over the period 1996-2001. Note
that, while levels differ, Champaign and Urbana appear to follow a similar
trend in log sale price over the study period.
Housing level descriptive statistics, including the log sale price, are pre-
sented in Table B.1. The most important variable is, of course, the log sale
price. Note that prices tend to be higher in Champaign than in Urbana,
both before and after the policy change. In particular, the median (aver-
10The data sets are combined using the unique Property Identification Number (PIN)
assigned to each home by the County.
11While the MLS data includes a lot of attribute information, one major drawback
is that it is incomplete as it only includes listings for sales through a licensed broker.
Moreover, the data is not consistent and is subject to selective reporting (i.e., with the
purpose of selling the house).
12Attributes from DataQuick are based on assessments from 2012, the most recent
property assessments when the data was purchased. MLS provides attributes as listed
on the MLS at the time the property was on the market.
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age) sale price is roughly $82,000 ($81,200) in pre-choice Champaign, versus
roughly $66,000 ($68,600) in pre-choice Urbana. After the policy change,
the median sale price is about $94,000 in Champaign and about $78,000 in
Urbana. However, there is also more variation in prices in Champaign than
in Urbana, which reflects the larger housing market in Champaign.
Square feet (Sqft), lot size (Lotsize), and basement (Basement) are pre-
sented in 1000 square feet. Garage is an indicator that takes the value 1 if
the property has a garage or carport, and is 0 otherwise. It is worth not-
ing that square footage and lot size tends to be larger in Champaign than
in Urbana, but once again there is also more variation in these attributes in
Champaign. Another major difference is that neighborhood schools—defined
as a home’s pre-choice residence-based assignment—are on average further
from homes in Champaign than from homes in Urbana. Once again, there is
more variation in these distances for Champaign, and this pattern simply re-
flects the fact that Champaign is a bit larger than Urbana (see, for instance,
the map in Figure B.1). On the other hand, homes in Urbana are generally
older. More importantly, the other key attributes—number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, basement size, and presence of garage or carport—are
generally similar in both cities.
The housing data provides addresses which I geocoded13 and matched to
basic Census tract and level demographics.14 Table B.2 presents descriptive
statistics on demographics at the Census tract level, by district and by treat-
ment period. Once again, there appear to be some differences (e.g., with
respect to number of households and median income) that are also accom-
panied by more variation in Champaign. Differences in the median value of
owner-occupied units at the Census tract level appear to reflect the same
trend found in the housing-level data. One key attribute that is similar for
both cities, as reflected in the housing-level data, is median number of rooms.
Public school data is gathered from multiple sources, and Table B.3 presents
descriptive statistics for schools, broken down by district and treatment pe-
riod. The Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) provides annual school
and district level “report cards” for every public school district in Illinois.15
13I used several free services, including the Census geocoder, Nokia HERE’s geocoder,
and Google’s geocoder.
14Unfortunately, I could not obtain data a finer scale than Census tract for Champaign-
Urbana.
15Report cards can be downloaded from http://www.isbe.net/assessment/report card.
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Most importantly, the school level data includes figures on enrollment and
performance on standardized tests, broken down by various demographics. In
the table, I present summaries for measures used in the analysis: enrollment,
average class size, percent black students, percent low income students, and
the fraction of third grade standardized test takers who exceed state goals on
reading and math.16 At the district level, the local school district property
tax rate is available from Champaign County. In any given fiscal year, the
school district tax rate is higher in Urbana than in Champaign. More im-
portantly, note that the percent of students who exceed state goals on third
grade mathematics and reading exams is similar across both districts, before
and after the policy change. In fact, the standard deviations are similar as
well. Note that enrollment is generally larger in Champaign, which is a big-
ger district, and this is one reason for the differences in average class sizes. A
more important contrast is that Champaign has a higher pecentage of black
students, while Urbana has a higher percentage of low income students.17
The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) provides an annual
series called the Common Core of Data (CCD), a comprehensive list of public
schools in the United States. The CCD includes some basic demographics as
well as the school’s physical address. This is geocoded and merged with the
ISBE data.18
School assignment policy information is provided directly by the school
districts. This includes parent outreach materials, board minutes, and at-
tendance area maps.19 Using scanned pdf images of attendance areas, I used
GIS software to reconstruct attendance area maps for each district. These
maps are used to compute, for instance, distances between homes and schools,
walk-zones, and the number of schools within a home’s walk-zone.
htm.
16ISBE provides the fraction of standardized test takers who are below, meet, or exceed
state goals, for subjects including reading, math, science, and social studies, at various
grade levels. Testing begins in the third grade.
17Recall that Champaign has nine elementary schools before the policy change, closing
one and opening two new schools in the first academic year of the policy change, while
Urbana always has the same six elementary schools.
18Note that CCD provides longitude and latitude information. However, the coordinates
for the same physical address are not always consistent. Geocoding is done using the
Census geocoder.
19Current maps for Urbana School District 116 are on the district’s website, http://
www.usd116.org/schools/elementary-attendance-areas/. Historical attendance area maps
for both Champaign and Urbana were obtained by FOIA requests.
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For the selection equation, I need a variable that affects selection but
not the price of a home. The variable I use is the buyer’s origin: is the
buyer coming from Champaign, Urbana, or elsewhere? The Dataquick data
provides a buyer’s address for each transaction. I construct a three-level
factor based on the buyer’s zip code.
As mentioned in section 2.2, I restrict my dataset to the period 1996-2001,
just prior to Urbana changing its attendance area boundaries. Moreover, I
drop sale prices in the top and bottom two percentiles, i.e., I drop the top 2%
and bottom 2% of house prices. This seems to provide a reasonable sale price
distribution; see Figure B.5. Table B.4 tabulates number of observations in
each district by treatment and control. Note that the number of observations
in the treatment state is roughly equal to the number of observations in the
control state.20
2.4.2 Model specification
In this section, I present the hedonic specification underlying the difference-
in-differences approach.
Let Yijt be the log sale price for home i in district j at time t. The baseline
linear hedonic diff-in-diff specification is:
Yijt = γj + γt +Dijtδ + z
T
h γh + z
T
s γs + z
T
n γn + x
Tγx + vijt (2.2)
zh =
(
Sqft, Lotsize, Age Home, Garage, Basement, Bedrooms, Baths
)T
zs =
(
School Distance, District Tax Rate, Average Class Size, Math, Reading
)T
zn =
(
Median Income, Median Rooms,
Owner Occupied Units, Owner Occupied Median Value
)T
where γj is a school district fixed effect, γt is a year fixed effect, and zh, zs, zn
represent house-, school-, and neighborhood-level observables, respectively.
Note that school-level observables—School Distance, Average Class Size,
20The table also demonstrates how much larger the Champaign housing market is rela-
tive to Urbana’s.
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Math, and Reading21—correspond to the property’s pre-choice neighborhood
school. See Section 2.4.1 for more details. An important control in (2.2) is x,
which represents Buyer Origin (Champaign, Urbana, or Other). This vari-
able should affect treatment and not house price, hopefully providing control
for unobservable confounders.
The key to causal inference in the current specification (2.2) is the Dijt
term, where Dijt = 1 if and only if home i is in Champaign, post-choice.
That is, Dijt designates treatment. In the next subsection, I present results
from estimating (2.2).
2.4.3 Estimation results
The coefficient of interest in (2.2) is δ, which is an estimate of the average
treatment effect, ∆ ≡ E[Y1 − Y0].22 Results are shown in Table B.5.
Importantly, the DD model suggests that, on average, households prefer
school choice over residence-based assignment. In particular, the estimate of
δ = 0.0682 implies households are willing to pay at least 7% more for school
choice.23
I also consider mixed-effects models, with random intercepts varying by
school district and year. Results are shown in Table B.6. Model 1 is the
random intercept specification, with observations grouped by school district
and year. Model 2 is the random intercept and slope specification, with slopes
varying by treatment assignment. Both specifications are fairly consistent
with the DD model estimated in Table B.5, albeit a bit lower. The estimates
of δ ' 0.06 imply a lower bound on the treatment effect of about 5.8-6%.
One might naturally wonder if these results are sensitive to the particular
specification in (2.2). Rather than estimating various permutations of the
same basic model, I consider regularization methods for data-driven variable
21Math and Reading represent the percentage of third grade students that exceed state
goals on each standardized test.
22More precisely, δ is a lower bound on the percentage difference between Y1 and Y0,
since the model is estimated in log sale prices. This follows from Jensen’s inequality.
23This follows from the fact that E[y1/y0] = E[exp(Y1 − Y0)] ≥ exp(E[Y1 − Y0]) =
exp(0.0682) = 1.07, where y1, y0 are prices in levels and Y1, Y0 are prices in logs.
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selection.24 Lasso regression coefficient estimates are shown in Table B.7.25
Regularization by elastic net includes lasso and ridge regressions as special
cases, and can mix continuously between the two; see Friedman et al. (2010).
For brevity, I present only results for the lasso, but it is worth noting that
ridge regression, as well as various mixtures of the two, yield similar results.
Importantly, all of the regularized models consistently estimate δ ' 0.05,
implying a lower bound of about 5% on the willingness to pay for school
choice relative to residence-based assignment.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to estimate the relative values of two market de-
signs. In particular, I leverage a natural experiment to compare the value of
school choice relative to traditional residence-based assignment. Using a lin-
ear hedonic difference-in-differences model, I find that households are willing
to pay (at least) between 5-7% more for school choice on average.
One limitation of the present study is the linear specification. It is very
unlikely that the true hedonic price function is linear. Another limitation is
that the results simply reflect a lower bound on the average willingness to pay.
This measure lumps all households together, but it is unlikely that the effects
are the same for higher-income households, who have the ability to pay for
their desired school, and for lower-income households, who do not. It would
be worthwhile to decompose the effect among different types of households,
and moreover to estimate the full distribution rather than simply the average.
One possibility that addresses both of these concerns is to estimate a semi-
or non-parametric kernel regression. Another possibility is to model the full
distribution of both counterfactual prices and a household’s selection into
their district in a Bayesian semi-parametric mixture model. Such extensions
are left for future work.
24Regularization methods penalize regression models for increasing complexity that does
not improve prediction, e.g., as measured by MSE. As such, they are analogous to placing
a particular prior on the parameters (normal for ridge, Laplace for lasso). Ridge regres-
sion shrinks coefficients toward zero, while lasso performs variable selection by discarding
coefficients.
25The regularization parameter is chosen to minimize cross-validation error.
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Chapter 3
Uncoordinated One-to-One Matching Markets
with Blake Riley
3.1 Introduction
Suppose you are tasked with pairing a group of men and a group of women
together when each person has preferences over potential partners. Can you
accomplish this task such that, once your matching is in place, no man or
woman can obtain a better partner on their own? In a seminal paper, Gale
and Shapley (1962) model this situation as a marriage market and present an
elegant solution: the deferred acceptance algorithm. Gale and Shapley (1962)
use their algorithm to prove that such stable matchings exist in two-sided
markets. While Gale and Shapley (1962) did not aim to provide guidance
on applied market design, their algorithm has come to play a key role in the
design of centralized markets.1 The question we address in this paper is: how
well can agents do without centralization?
Gale and Shapley (1962)’s algorithm has been independently discovered by
practitioners many times. As Roth (1984a) showed, the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP) for new doctors had been using a version of de-
ferred acceptance since 1951. Several other instances of the algorithm in the
field were later documented, including the job market for clinical psycholo-
gists and dorm room assignment at MIT (Roth, 2008). Such observations re-
newed interest in Gale and Shapley (1962)’s stylized model of matching, with
stability as the principal objective and deferred acceptance as the foundation
for practical market design. Eventually, deferred acceptance became funda-
mental to the intentional reorganization of existing markets as centralized
clearinghouses, most notably in the redesign of the assignment mechanisms
for Boston Public Schools (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005d) and New York City
1Gale and Shapley (1962) do state their hope “that some of the ideas introduced here
might usefully be applied to certain phases of the admissions problem.”
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High Schools (Abdulkadirog˘lu et al., 2005b).
The deferred acceptance algorithm is practical in applications since it can
find a stable matching in polynomial time. With n men and m women in a
marriage market, deferred acceptance computes a stable matching in at most
n·m steps. Its speed and simplicity make it a natural candidate for centralized
design, but there is nothing inherently centralized about deferred acceptance.
The standard interpretation of the algorithm as one side of the market making
successive proposals has a decentralized flavor to it since proposing agents
don’t need information beyond their own preferences. However, agents have
to be coordinated in two ways to properly execute deferred acceptance. First,
only one side of the market can make proposals. Second, proposals must be
grouped into rounds where agents propose at most once (though the order
of proposals within rounds can be arbitrary). We argue that coordination is
the distinguishing feature between centralized and decentralized markets.
In particular, we consider a class of decentralized matching markets intro-
duced by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). Their idea, roughly, is to let agents
take turns making proposals to a more preferred partner. Two agents that
prefer each other to their current respective partners are said to form a block-
ing pair. Roth and Vande Vate (1990) show that, starting from an arbitrary
matching, such random proposal processes eventually converge to a stable
matching if each blocking pair has positive probability of being selected.
While these results suggest agents can attain stability without a centralized
authority, Ackermann et al. (2011) show some markets almost certainly re-
quire exponentially many proposals to reach stability when blocking pairs are
rematched uniformly at random. One is tempted to conclude that, in prac-
tice, decentralized markets cannot be ensured of reaching a stable matching.
However, the process described above portrays market participants as naive.
In particular, agents will accept any proposal when they are single. We intro-
duce slightly more sophisticated behavior into the process and show that the
process converges to stability in polynomial time for moderately sized mar-
kets. Moreover, since centralization by way of deferred acceptance requires
at most a quadratic number rounds, we compare welfare under our process
after a comparable number of rounds to the outcome of deferred acceptance.
In section 3.2, we introduce the matching environment and the model for
proposal processes. Computational results are presented in section 3.3. In
section 3.3.1, we explore convergence to stable matching in terms of number of
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proposals, while in section 3.3.2, we compare welfare of our proposal processes
before convergence to welfare under stable matching. Figures are presented
in Appendix C.1 and tables are presented in Appendix C.2.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Environment
We consider a standard one-to-one matching environment with strict prefer-
ences. In particular, a matching market of size n is a triple θ = (M,W,)
consisting of a set of n men M , a set of n + m women W , and preferences
= {i}i∈M∪W for each agent i over potential partners on the other side of
the market.
Preferences are strict linear orders over the set of potential partners for
that agent and the option to remain unmatched, denoted by ∅. Agent i finds
agent j acceptable if j i ∅. We will consider environments θ where every
man finds every woman acceptable and vice-versa. Let Θn denote the set
of all such markets of size n. An environment θ is balanced for some n if
m = 0, and otherwise it is unbalanced.
A matching is a function µ : M∪W →M∪W∪{∅} describing how agents
are paired. Let X (θ) denote the set of all matchings for θ. The partner of
agent i under matching µ is µ(i). The agent is single if µ(i) = ∅. Valid
matchings satisfy the following properties:
1. If µ(i) 6= ∅, then µ(µ(i)) = i, i.e. if an agent i has a partner, µ(i), then
µ(i)’s partner is i.
2. µ(M) ⊆ W ∪ {∅} and µ(W ) ⊆ M ∪ {∅}, i.e. all agents are either
matched to an agent from the other side or single.
A matching µ is stable in θ if there is no pair of agents m,w such that
m w µ(w) and w m µ(w) and no agent i such that ∅ i µ(i). Since
we consider only environments where all agents are mutually acceptable, the
second requirement that all agents prefer their partners to being single is
satisfied in every matching. Let S(θ) denote the set of stable matchings for
market θ.
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3.2.2 Proposal processes as models of matching
Given a matching market θ, agents begin at some initial matching µ0 with
distribution f0(µ) = Pr(µ0 = µ). We will primarily consider µ0 as the empty
matching where µ0(i) = ∅ for all i ∈ M ∪W . Matchings evolve according
to a sequence of proposals between agents, with one proposal being made at
discrete time steps, t = 1, 2, . . ..
A proposal process, P , describes who makes a proposal at each step,
who the proposer proposes to, and the conditions for whether a proposal is
accepted. Given matching µt at step t, if agent i proposes to agent j and the
proposal is accepted, then µt is updated as follows:
1. i and j are paired together: µt+1(i) = j and µt+1(j) = i,
2. i and j’s previous partners (if any) are now single: µt+1(µt(i)) =
µt+1(µt(j)) = ∅,
3. and µt+1(k) = µt(k) for all other agents k.
If the proposal is not accepted, then no change occurs, and µt+1 = µt.
Deferred acceptance as a proposal process
In general, a proposal process may be random, inducing a random walk over
the set of matchings, although deterministic proposal processes can also be
considered. For instance, two versions of the deferred acceptance algorithm—
with either men proposing or women proposing—are important examples of
deterministic proposal processes.
Deferred acceptance can also be implemented semi-randomly by picking a
fixed permutation of the proposing side and having the agents cycle through
proposals according to this schedule. Supposing men are proposing, each
man knows every other man has acted exactly once since his last proposal.
This fixed schedule provides a monotonicity guarantee that underlie deferred
acceptance. If an agent is unsure whether or not someone else has acted since
their last proposal, the same monotonicity guarantee is no longer present
and proposers are unable to work down their preference lists in the same
way. Someone who once rejected me might now accept me, so the set of
possible partners to consider making proposals doesn’t shrink. Of course, it
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wouldn’t be worthwhile to only always propose to my first choice, so a lack
of knowledge about when others have acted necessitates some randomness in
how proposals are made. The continued need to explore all possible partners
particularly holds if both men and women make proposals.
Uncoordinated proposal processes
To represent agents being unable to fully coordinate or observe the actions of
others, we consider proposal processes where at each point in time, one agent
is selected at random to act. The probability that a man makes a proposal
might differ from the probability a woman makes a proposal, but within each
side, all agents have an equal chance of acting.
With no knowledge about the actions of others, how should an agent choose
who to propose to? A simple answer is to randomly propose to someone bet-
ter than that agent’s current match. A woman who has repeatedly rejected
a man might still potentially accept him now, so the man might plausibly
think it’s worth another shot. If the man can keep track of all the partners
of the women he is proposing to, the best he can do is never propose to a
women who is with the same partner as a time when she rejected him.
Definition 3.1 (Random better (best) reply). Begin at random matching
µ0 with some probability p(µ0). Given µt−1 at time t:
1. Pick a proposing agent it ∈M ∪W at random
2. Better (best) reply: Agent it proposes to an agent (the best agent)
jt such that
jt it µt−1(it)
choosing uniformly at random if multiple such jt exist.
3. Agent jt accepts if it jt µt−1(jt)
(a) If jt accepts, update µt
(b) Else, set µt = µt−1
Set t = t+ 1, and return to step 1.
Ackermann et al. (2011) show that these processes may take exponen-
tially many rounds to reach stability. On some level, naive behavior by both
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proposers and responders causes unnecessary delay. We now introduce two
proposal processes that model plausible behavior for both proposers and re-
sponders without requiring a high level of sophistication.
To address naive behavior by responders, we introduce aspirations as a
way for responders to keep from settling for inferior matches early on in the
process. An agent’s aspiration level is simply the minimum partner rank the
agent is willing to accept. A responder will accept a proposal subject to their
current aspiration level, which evolves over time.
Let ρ(i, j) denote agent i’s ranking of agent j wrt i:
ρ(i, j) ≡ |{k : k i j}|
We say that agent i has aspiration level αt(i) at µt if i accepts a proposal
from any agent j ∈ {j : ρ(i, j) ≤ αt(i)} and rejects a proposal otherwise.
Aspiration levels are set and updated as follows:
Definition 3.2 (Updating aspiration levels). Given an environment θ and a
proposal process P with aspiration adjustment an ∈ R+:
• At t = 0, initial aspiration is α0(j) = 1, ∀j
• At t > 0, if j receives a proposal from i, then
αt(j) =
ρ(j, i), µt(j) = iαt(j) + an, µt(j) = ∅
otherwise, αt(j) = αt−1(j)
In other words, a responder j who accepts a proposal from a proposer i
sets their aspiration to their current partner’s rank. If instead j rejects i’s
proposal, then j must adjust αt(j) to become less picky if j remains single,
or else j’s aspiration remains set to their current partner, µt(j).
To address naive behavior by proposers, we allow agents to learn who is
better than them. In particular, if a man i is rejected by a woman j when she
is partnered with some other man k, then man i should not waste another
proposal on woman j if she remains partnered with k. That is, man i learns
by revealed preference that k j i. Let λ(i) denote i’s unattainable set.
This is the set of all pairs of agents in which the woman’s partner is preferred
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to man i,
λ(i) = {(j, k) ∈ W ×M : k j i},
with a symmetric definition for a woman i. Since agent preferences are private
information, this set is empty at t = 0 and updated by agent i whenever he
is rejected in favor of another man. We thus define learning as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Learning). Given an environment θ, a proposal process P
admits learning if each agent i’s unattainable set λt(i) is updated at t > 0
as
λt(i) =
λt−1(i) ∪ (j, µt(j)), j rejects i at tλt−1(i), else
with λ0(i) = ∅,∀i ∈M ∪W .
An agent j is attainable at µt for agent i if
(j, µt(j)) 6∈ λt(i),
that is, if j is not partnered with an agent µt(j) for whom i has been rejected
before. It is natural, for example, for a man making a proposal to propose
to an attainable woman, rather than proposing to a woman who will surely
reject him.
We are now ready to define our first proposal process.
Definition 3.4 (Random best attainable). Begin at random matching µ0
with some probability p(µ0). Given µt−1 at time t:
1. Pick a proposing agent it ∈M ∪W at random
2. Best attainable proposal: Agent it proposes to the best agent jt
such that
jt it µt−1(it) and (jt, µt−1(jt)) 6∈ λt(it)
(a) If no such jt exists, set µt = µt−1, set t = t+ 1, and return to step
1.
(b) Else, go to step 3.
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3. Agent jt accepts if ρ(jt, it) jt αt−1(jt)
(a) If jt accepts, update αt, µt
(b) Else, update αt and set µt = µt−1
Set t = t+ 1, and return to step 1.
Together, learning and aspirations guide pairs of men and women into
“good” matches early on, so that only small adjustments are necessary in
order to get to a stable match. In contrast, better and best reply dynamics
are characterized by an inordinate amount of matching, breaking up, and
re-matching, with adjustments toward stability fairly random.
Learning allows proposers to use their proposals more wisely. In principle,
proposing agents can learn the preferences of agents on the other side, given
sufficient proposals. Beyond learning all of the men preferred to himself,
a man can learn which other men do not represent “competition.” Thus,
learning can facilitate earlier pairwise matching.
On the other side, aspirations ensure responders do not settle into infe-
rior matches too quickly. The danger from doing so, e.g., in the best reply
dynamics, is that a lot of time is spent re-matching.
One potential problem with this process is that a man may cycle through
a long list of attainable women before actually securing a match. Indeed,
once a man learns which other men are preferred he has no proposal to make
if the women remain matched to such men.
An alternative is for a proposing man to pursue single women first. If a man
does not have a best attainable woman available, but there are unmatched
women waiting around, then it seems reasonable to go after a single woman
rather than losing the opportunity to propose. If it is desirable for agents to
secure early matches, then it is natural that men propose to single women
first. Of course, if no single woman is available, the best a man can do is to
pursue his best attainable woman, if one is available.
We are now ready to define our second proposal process.
Definition 3.5 (Random singles first). Modify the Random best attainable
proposal process as follows:
2. Best singles proposal: Agent it proposes to the best agent jt such
that
µt−1(jt) = ∅
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(a) Best attainable proposal: If no best single jt exists, it proposes
to the best attainable jt
(b) If no such jt exists, set µt = µt−1, set t = t+ 1, and return to step
1.
(c) Else, go to step 3.
The random singles first process is even more biased toward early matching
than the random best attainable process. It represents a more risk-averse
approach, in the sense that being matched is more important than finding
the best match. Combined with learning and aspirations, the process should
settle more quickly into “good” matches so that the path toward stability is
less volatile in terms of re-matching.
3.3 Computational results
In this section, we present computational results on convergence to stability
and welfare for our two proposal processes, in both balanced and unbalanced
markets.
In what follows, the aspiration adjustment for an environment θ of size n
is set to decrease with the inverse of n as:
an ≡ 10
n
,
where n = 10 is the smallest market we consider.
3.3.1 Convergence to stability in uncoordinated matching
markets
The most natural way to simulate random sampling of a matching market
θ ∈ Θn is to sample a preference list for each agent. Since we only consider
markets in which every agent prefers being matched to being unmatched, this
amounts to sampling a permutation of a {1, 2, . . . , n}. Sampling is carried
out uniformly at random, independently for each agent. Sufficient random
sampling in this way should capture most typical instances, but convergence
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of a proposal process is best characterized by convergence in the worst cases.2
How much random sampling is needed to credibly capture the worst cases is
unclear in general. In the balanced case, however, we actually know what the
worst case instances look like. Consider the class of markets θ, represented as
a weighted graph, in Table C.1. A market can be represented as a weighted
graph as follows: let ω(m,w) ∈ {1, . . . , n} denote the weight of edge (m,w).
Then
m w m′ ⇔ω(m,w) < ω(m′, w)
w m w′ ⇔ω(m,w) > ω(m,w′)
Thus, the instances represented in Table C.1 are such that a woman’s favorite
man ranks that woman last in his preferences, while a woman’s least favorite
man ranks her first ; a woman’s second favorite man ranks that woman second
to last, and so on.
In such markets, any matching such that every woman is matched to their
kth ranked man is stable. To see this, suppose k = 2. Then the weight
for each pair (m,w) must be 2, in which case a man m can only improve
his partner’s rank by matching with a woman for whom m is worse than
her current partner. Thus, there are no blocking pairs. Ensuring that each
woman is matched to a man just so is what prevents random better and best
reply processes from finding stability.
The class of preferences shown in Table C.1 are presented by Ackermann
et al. (2011) as instances in which random better and best reply proposal
processes can take 2Ω(n) steps to converge on a stable matching. Ackermann
et al. (2011) do not claim that this class uniquely represents the worst case
scenario. However, Hoffman et al. (2013)’s characterization of the time to
reach a given stable matching in terms of the size and depth of its jealousy
graph shows that such instances indeed are the most problematic for random
better (and, by extension, best) reply processes.
The number of proposals needed to reach a stable matching, as a multiple
of n3, is shown in Figures C.1-C.6. We consider the random best attainable
process first.
2A natural question is what effect correlated preferences would have on finding a stable
matching. It turns out that correlation makes finding a stable matching much easier,
because in some sense the correlation coordinates agent behavior.
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In random balanced markets, the best attainable process appears to con-
sistently find a stable matching at a small fraction of n3 steps, especially
as n grows large. This is illustrated in Figure C.1 for 200 simulations from
n = 10, . . . , 500. The effect of adding a single agent on one side is shown in
Figure C.2. The pattern is similar to the exactly balanced case, albeit with
higher variance, based on 500 simulations over the same range of n. How-
ever, as shown in Figure C.3, the hard instances prove challenging. Over 150
simulations for n = 10, . . . , 300, the number of proposals needed to find a
stable matching is growing in n. Note that while the larger instances appear
to converge at a reasonable multiple of n3, we cap the simulations at 25n3.
In other words, the random best attainable process appears to be exploding
with n.
We now turn to the random singles first process. Figure C.4 shows results
of 500 simulations of random balanced environments for n = 10, . . . , 500.
Once again, the rate of convergence is a fraction of n3, which is unsurprising
as this process is an improvement over the best attainable process. Moreover,
the addition of another agent on one side of the market has a negligible
impact on convergence, as seen in Figure C.5. With an additional woman in
the market, the singles first proposal process still finds a stable matching at
a rate less than n3, based again on 500 simulations for n = 10, . . . , 500.
In Figure C.6, we plot convergence for hard instances of a balanced mar-
ket, for n = 10, . . . , 500, based on 300 simulations. Note that the time to
reach stability is still bounded by a small multiple of n3 below approximately
n = 400. Beyond this amount, potentially exponential growth starts to take
over. Still, this is stark improvement over the naive random better and best
reply processes where exponential growth is immediately apparent. This is
encouraging if we hope moderately large uncoordinated markets reach sta-
bility.
3.3.2 Welfare of uncoordinated markets prior to reaching
stability
While a polynomial number of proposals is much more feasible than an ex-
ponential number of proposals, it can still be unrealistic for growth at rates
faster than O(n2). Since the deferred acceptance algorithm can require O(n)
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proposals from each agent to find a stable match, we should expect a ran-
domized proposal process to take at least as long. If we interpret a proposal
as an indication of interest rather than a formal proposal, a person in a
market with n = 500 people on each side could plausibly make 1, 000 or
2, 000 proposals, corresponding to O(n2) proposals total. On the other hand,
250, 000 or 500, 000 proposals per agent—corresponding to O(n3) proposals
total—pushes the bounds of believability even with a loose interpretation
what counts as a proposal. Is there a downside to agents stopping their
search early before reaching stability? In this section, we investigate the wel-
fare of matches found by random proposal processes after a small multiple
of n2 proposals.
The biggest potential cost of uncoordinated matching is that too many
agents are single at a given point in time. The Random Singles First process
attempts to address this problem in a greedy fashion by having agents break
up an existing couple only when unavoidable. Figures C.8 and C.7 show
the proportion of single agents at multiples of n2 for balanced and almost
balanced markets respectively at n = 50. Nearly every agent is matched with
some partner within the first n2 proposals. Figure C.9 of the proportion of
single agents in an almost balanced market of n = 1000 shows this isn’t
simply a feature of small markets. Once again, most agents are partnered
within the first n2 proposals and, after the initial matching, about 5% of
agents are single at any one time. Since most agents are matched, it is now
reasonable to focus on the welfare of matched agents.
A natural measure of welfare in environments characterized by rank-order
preferences is the average rank of agents at a given match. Consider an
environment θn with n men and n + m women. Let ρt(i) ≡ ρ(i, µt(i)) =
|{j : j i µt(i)}| denote the rank of i’s partner at matching µt. Then
the average rank of men’s partners at µt is R
M
t ≡ 1nt
∑
i∈M ρt(i), where
nt = |{i ∈ M : µt(i) ∈ W | is the number of men matched to women under
µt. If µMOSM is the man-optimal stable matching, the average rank of men
at µMOSM is R
M
MOSM.
For a given environment θ, we can easily compute the optimal stable
matches µMOSM and µWOSM in order to compare average rank at the current
matching of a proposal process. In particular, we will focus on the average
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improvement in rank at µt relative to woman-optimal stable matching:
QMt ≡
1
nt
∑
i∈M
(ρWOSM(i)− ρt(i)) (Men)
QWt ≡
1
nt
∑
i∈W
(ρWOSM(i)− ρt(i)) (Women)
QTt ≡
(
QMt +Q
W
t
)
/2 (Total)
The literature has developed a good idea of what the average ranks of
optimal matches look like in terms of market size n when preferences are
drawn uniformly at random. For balanced θ with n men and n women,
Pittel (1989) has shown that RMMOSM
p−→ log n and RMWOSM p−→ nlogn . Ashlagi
et al. (forthcoming) explore unbalanced markets and find that the difference
in welfare between the man-optimal and woman-optimal matches collapses
rapidly with the addition of even a single person. In a market with n men
and n + 1 women, the average rank of the men’s partners is log n and the
average rank of the women’s partners is m
logn
with high probability in every
stable match. In other words, being on the short side of the market provides
the same advantage as being on the proposing side in a balanced market.
Because the addition of a single person drastically changes the set of stable
matches, we should view balanced markets as a special case. Without loss of
generality, we assume men are on the short side when considering unbalanced
markets.
In 500 simulated almost balanced markets with n men and n+1 women, all
but one match found by the Random Singles First process after 5n2 proposals
had a better average rank among all matched agents relative to the MOSM.
In the sole simulation that didn’t have strictly better average welfare, the
process found the unique stable match within the given number of proposals.
Relative to the WOSM, 485 simulations had strictly better average ranks, 12
were equal to the WOSM, and 3 were worse. Every time the total average
rank was better than the WOSM average rank, men did relatively worse and
women did relatively better.
As shown in figure C.10, the short side of the market still has a better
average rank than the long side in almost every instance despite doing worse
than in any stable match. The short side is unable to fully use its advantage
when matching is uncoordinated. Figure C.11 shows how the average rank
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of men compares to the WOSM as n changes. Figure C.12 shows the average
rank across both men and women relative to the WOSM. Not only is the
uncoordinated match is more egalitarian between the two sides relative to
stability, it results in an overall better average ranks.
The situation is even more striking when the imbalance between sides
grows. We now consider markets with n men on the short side and 1.5n
women on the long side of the market. Figure C.13 shows the short side
of the market is roughly logarithmically worse in the uncoordinated match
relative to the WOSM. With 500 men and 750 women, this means the short
side is matched with their 2nd or 3rd rank partner rather than their 1st or
2nd rank partner on average. In contrast, a person on the the long side of
the market is paired with their 140th best partner rather than their 220th
best partner.
These results suggest that decentralized matching can be better for agents
overall, particularly if an agent is unsure a priori whether they will be on the
long or short side of the market. The evident hardness of finding stability in
large coordinated markets ends up being an advantage rather than a failing.
Unless a market is obviously failing due to instability or there is a reason all
matches should happen quickly and simultaneously, this is a reason to avoid
centralization.
3.4 Conclusion
We present two proposal processes that suggest uncoordinated two-sided
matching markets perform well when agents aren’t completely naive. While
our results don’t fully resolve the question of whether uncoordinated mar-
kets tend to reach stable matches, either answer turns out to be encouraging.
Simulations show the random singles first proposal process reaches stability
in small to medium sized markets within a small multiple of n3 proposals.
This holds even for the hardest-to-match set of preferences. On the other
hand, if the process is cut-off before reaching stability, the resulting matches
are more egalitarian and have better average welfare. Either way, our results
suggest centralization has no advantage unless the market is unraveling or
suffers another clear market failure.
Substantial work remains in the study of decentalized matching markets.
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The asymptotic behavior of uncoordinated matching for random preferences
or more realistic correlated preferences remains an open question. Another
open question is whether a more sophisticated proposal process reaches sta-
bility with high probability in polynomial time for all possible preferences.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1.2
Let the set of terms be TA = TB = {tL, tH}, with tL < tH and tL strictly
preferred to tH by all agents, all else equal.
Let Y denote the A-optimal stable allocation. Suppose |{a ∈ A : (Y a)TA =
tL}| < |{a ∈ A : (Y a)TA = tL}|, for some stable allocation Y . Then there
is some agent a ∈ A that has either: (i) no contracts at Y , or (ii) only
tH-contracts at Y .
Consider case (i). If some b ∈ (Y a)B has no contracts at Y then (a, b)
form a blocking pair for Y . So all b ∈ (Y a)B have contracts with some side
A agents in Y . Moreover, these contracts must be preferred to those in Y
or they can block Y with a. But this contradicts Y as the B-pessimal stable
allocation.
Consider case (ii). Let y ∈ Y a such that yTA = tL. Suppose yB ∈ (Y
a
)B,
and let y ∈ Y a be the associated contract. Suppose yI = yI . By the assump-
tion that all agents prefer tL-contracts to tH-contracts, y ∈ Ca(Y ∪Y ) 6= Y a,
regardless of yTB , yTB . This contradicts A-optimality of Y . So yI 6= yI , and
there exists z ∈ Xa that coincides with y except zTA = tL. Then a and yB
mutually prefer z to y, contradicting stability of Y .
Therefore yB ∈ Y a ⇒ yB 6∈ (Y a)B. Moreover, such agents yB must have
contracts in Y or they can form a blocking pair for Y with a. Thus such
agents yB have contracts with different side-A agents at Y . These contracts
are preferred by yB to y, otherwise they can block Y with a. But this
contradicts Y as B-pessimal stable.
An analogous argument shows that the number of side-B agents that sign
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tH-contracts at Y is weakly higher than at any other stable allocation.
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 1.3
Consider an allocationX ′. Without loss of generality, assume agents are asso-
ciated with two platforms i and i′ such that |{a ∈ A : (X ′a)I = i and (X ′a)TA =
t}| > |{a ∈ A : (X ′a)I = i′ and (X ′a)TA = t}| > 0. Consider an agent
b ∈ B such that (Xb)TB = t. Suppose (X ′b)I 6= i. Let the set of side A
agents whose term is t and who are associated with platform i be A′. Let
Y = {x ∈ X : xB = b, xA ∈ A′, and xI = i}. Then Y ′ = X ′A′ ∪ Y forms a
blocking set of contracts.
Therefore, X ′ is not a stable allocation. That is, there cannot be a stable
allocation in which one platform i has more side-A agents signing t contracts
than another platform i′. Similarly, there cannot be a stable allocation in
which platform i has more side-B agents signing t contracts than platform i′.
Then either i has all agents who sign t contracts, or i and i′ have the same
number of agents.
Obviously, if all agents signing t contracts are at platform i, this is stable.
Suppose i and i′ have the same number of agents signing t contracts. By
the law of aggregate demand for similar terms, the set of agents who join i′
prefer the allocation in which all agents join i. So this cannot be stable.
A.1.3 Proof of Theorem 1.5
The proof below incorporates the following algorithm, an extension of Hat-
field and Milgrom (2005)’s cumulative offer algorithm to the many-to-many
setting introduced in Fung and Hsu (2014).
The many-to-many cumulative offer algorithm
The (side A-proposing) many-to-many cumulative offer algorithm works as
follows.
• Step 1: Let Oa(1) = Xa for all a ∈ A. An arbitrary side A agent
a1 proposes Y (1) = Ca1(Oa1(1)). Side B agents hold Cb(Yb(1)) for all
b ∈ B.
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– Let Ob(1) = Yb(1) for all b ∈ B.
– Let OB(1) = ∪b∈BOb(1) = Y (1).
• Step t: Let Oa(t) = Xa − RB(OB(t − 1)) for all a ∈ A. An arbitrary
side A agent at such that Cat(Oat(t)) 6⊂ CB(OB(t−1)) proposes Y (t) =
Cat(Oat(t)). Hospitals hold Cb(Ob(t− 1) ∪ Yb(t)) for all b ∈ B.
– Let Ob(t) = Ob(t− 1) ∪ Yb(t) for all b ∈ B.
– Let OB(t) = ∪b∈BOb(t) = OB(t− 1) ∪ Y (t).
The algorithm terminates in some step T such that Ca(Oa(T )) ⊂ CB(OB(T−
1)) for all a ∈ A. The final allocation is X ′ ≡ CA(OA(T )).
In Fung and Hsu (2014), we show the algorithm produces a stable al-
location in unitary many-to-many matching with contracts markets, under
substitutes as well as under weaker preference assumptions. We now prove
Theorem 1.5.
Proof. Suppose the preferences are lexicographic. Consider the following
construction.
For any X, construct a reduced problem X¯ such that for any x¯ ∈ X¯ we
have
x¯ = (a, b, i),
where a ∈ A, b ∈ B and i ∈ I. For any agent a ∈ A, we can construct a
reduced preference P¯a such that if x¯P¯ax¯
′ for any x¯, x¯′ ∈ X¯, then xPax′ for
some x, x′ ∈ X, where x¯A = x¯′A = xA = x′A = a, x¯B = xB, x¯′B = x′B, x¯I = xI ,
and x¯′I = x
′
I .
We use the following algorithm to produce a term-constrained stable allo-
cation. There are three steps.
• Step 1: For the reduced problem X¯ and reduced preferences P¯s∈A∪B,
run the many-to-many cumulative offere algorithm. The outcome is
X¯ ′.
• Step 2: For each platform i that has a positive number of agents associ-
ated with it, let the side B agent with the smallest index, say b, chooses
his favorite term among X. In other words, let the term assocaited with
a platform i be (Cb(X))TA,TB .
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For each platform i that has a positive number of agents associated
with it, let i(tA, tB) be the term that is produced by the above method.
• Step 3: Let X ′ ⊆ X be such that
1. (X ′a)B = (X¯ ′a)B, (X ′a)I = (X¯ ′a)I := i, and (X ′a)TA,TB = i(tA, tB),∀a ∈
X ′A;
2. (X ′b)A = (X¯ ′
b
)A, (X
′b)I = (X¯ ′b)I := j, and (X ′b)TA,TB = j(tA, tB),∀b ∈
X ′B.
We claim that X ′ is a term-constrained stable allocation. Note that if
the preference is not substitutable nor lexicogrpahic, the algorithm may not
produce a feasible allocation.
In the following, we show that X ′ is term-constrained stable.
1. The allocation X ′ is feasible: By lexicographic preference, for any
allocaiton X¯ ′ ⊆ X¯, if we create an allocation Y ⊆ X by assigning some
terms (tA, tB) to each platform i, so that for agents associated with platform
i, they also have the terms in their contracts, then the allocation Y is feasible.
This is precisely what the three-step algorithm does.
2. The allocation X ′ is IR: Implied by lexicogrpahic preference, for any
allocation X¯ ′ ⊆ X¯, if we create an allocation Y ⊆ X by assigning some
terms (tA, tB) to each paltform i, so that for agents assocaited with platform
i, they also have the terms in their contracts, then the allocation Y is IR.
Therefore, X ′ is IR.
3. The allocation does not have feasible blocking set: Since preferences
are substitutable, X¯ ′ is a stable allocation in the reduced problem. In other
words, no agents would jointly change the contracts so that they can switch
platforms or be matched with different agents in the reduced problem.
Since preferences are lexicographic, for each agent, the set of agents on the
other side and the platform in the contracts are more important than the
terms. No agents would jointly change the contracts so that they can switch
platforms or be matched with different agents. Within a platform i, the term
is chosen by the side B agent with the smallest index. In other words, agents
associated with i cannot jointly change the contracts so that they can have
different terms in their contracts, since there is at least one agent who would
disagree.
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Based on the above argument, the allocation X ′ is term-constrained stable
allocation.
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Appendix B
B.1 Figures
B.1.1 Elementary school attendance areas in
Champaign-Urbana
0mi 2mi 4mi
CUSD 4
USD 116
Figure B.1: Champaign and Urbana attendance areas, circa 1998. Points
represent schools.
56
BOTTENFIELD
CARRIE.BUSEY
COLUMBIA
GARDEN.HILLS
HOWARD
KENWOOD
ROBESON
SOUTH.SIDE
WESTVIEW
Figure B.2: Champaign attendance areas, circa 1989-1998. Points represent
schools corresponding to attendance area.
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Figure B.3: Urbana attendance areas, circa 1989-2002. Points represent
schools corresponding to attendance area.
B.1.2 Timeline of policy changes
1996 1998
CUSD 4:
school choice
2000 2002
USD 116:
boundaries
Figure B.4: Timeline of assignment policy changes
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B.1.3 Descriptives
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Figure B.5: Distribution of log sale price, before (left) and after (right) the
policy change.
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Figure B.6: Median log sale price over time.
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B.2 Tables
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Post Choice
School District Pre- Post- All
Champaign 2766 6371 9137
Urbana 959 2308 3267
All 3725 8679 12404
Table B.4: Number of observations by “treatment” and “control”
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B.2.2 Results
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> |t|)
(Intercept) -0.7444 1.2279 -0.61 0.5444
Sqft 0.0005 0.0000 32.19 0.0000
Lotsize 0.0001 0.0001 1.16 0.2449
Age Home -0.0018 0.0003 -5.49 0.0000
Garage 1 0.2341 0.0253 9.24 0.0000
Basement -0.0001 0.0000 -5.01 0.0000
Bedrooms -0.0440 0.0107 -4.12 0.0000
Baths Total 0.1077 0.0107 10.09 0.0000
Agency Name URBANA SD 116 -0.4804 0.1593 -3.02 0.0026
Neighborhood School Distance -0.0803 0.0065 -12.27 0.0000
Median Household Income 0.0000 0.0000 10.91 0.0000
Median Rooms -0.0720 0.0112 -6.41 0.0000
Owner Occupied Units 0.0001 0.0000 5.69 0.0000
Owner Occupied Median Value -0.0000 0.0000 -4.03 0.0001
Year 1997 0.0889 0.0266 3.35 0.0008
Year 1998 0.1116 0.0346 3.23 0.0013
Year 1999 0.2015 0.0518 3.89 0.0001
Year 2000 0.3738 0.0767 4.87 0.0000
Year 2001 0.4094 0.0797 5.14 0.0000
PIN 0.0000 0.0000 0.42 0.6773
School Tax Rate 0.9815 0.2779 3.53 0.0004
Class Size -0.0130 0.0023 -5.62 0.0000
Math 0.0052 0.0006 8.49 0.0000
Reading 0.0011 0.0006 1.76 0.0783
Buyer Origin Other -0.2554 0.0141 -18.16 0.0000
Buyer Origin URBANA SD 116 -0.0673 0.0186 -3.62 0.0003
d.obs 0.0682 0.0178 3.83 0.0001
Table B.5: Estimates for DD hedonic model
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Model 1 Model 2
(Intercept) 3.0077 3.1098
(0.2253) (0.2215)
Sqft 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Lotsize 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Age.Home −0.0017 −0.0017
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Garage1 0.2335 0.2324
(0.0254) (0.0253)
Basement −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Bedrooms −0.0442 −0.0440
(0.0107) (0.0107)
Baths.Total 0.1083 0.1080
(0.0107) (0.0107)
Neighborhood.School.Distance −0.0794 −0.0800
(0.0065) (0.0065)
Median.Household.Income 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Median.Rooms −0.0718 −0.0721
(0.0112) (0.0112)
Owner.Occupied.Units 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Owner.Occupied.Median.Value −0.0000 −0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
PIN 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
School.Tax.Rate 0.1462 0.1247
(0.0438) (0.0428)
Class.Size −0.0125 −0.0126
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Table B.6: Estimates for mixed-effects DD hedonic model
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Model 1 Model 2
Math 0.0053 0.0053
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Reading 0.0010 0.0011
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Buyer.OriginOther −0.2547 −0.2552
(0.0141) (0.0141)
Buyer.OriginURBANA SD 116 −0.0660 −0.0652
(0.0185) (0.0185)
d.obs 0.0580 0.0562
(0.0172) (0.6206)
AIC 17320.7928 17324.0587
BIC 17499.0114 17531.9804
Log Likelihood -8636.3964 -8634.0294
Num. obs. 12404 12404
Num. groups: Year 6 6
Num. groups: Agency.Name 2 2
Var: Year (Intercept) 0.0049 0.0068
Var: Agency.Name (Intercept) 0.0000 0.0000
Var: Residual 0.2297 0.2296
Var: Year d.obs 0.0007
Cov: Year (Intercept) d.obs -0.0022
Var: Agency.Name d.obs 0.3847
Cov: Agency.Name (Intercept) d.obs 0.0000
Table B.6 (cont.)
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Table B.7: Estimates for regularized DD hedonic model
Lasso estimates
(Intercept) 3.5313
Sqft 0.0005
Lotsize 0.0001
Age.Home -0.0016
Garage1 0.2328
Basement -0.0001
Bedrooms -0.0410
Baths.Total 0.1073
Agency.NameURBANA SD 116 0.0660
Neighborhood.School.Distance -0.0780
Median.Household.Income 0.00001
Median.Rooms -0.0643
Owner.Occupied.Units 0.0001
Owner.Occupied.Median.Value -0.000001
Year1997 0.0122
Year1998 .
Year1999 0.0217
Year2000 0.0995
Year2001 0.1241
PIN .
School.Tax.Rate 0.0041
Class.Size -0.0120
Math 0.0054
Reading 0.0008
Buyer.OriginOther -0.2514
Buyer.OriginURBANA SD 116 -0.0570
d.obs 0.0495
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Appendix C
C.1 Figures
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Figure C.1: Number of proposals to reach stability in Random Best
Attainable process in balanced random environment
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Figure C.2: Number of proposals to reach stability in Random Best
Attainable process in almost balanced random environment
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Figure C.3: Number of proposals to reach stability in Random Best
Attainable process in hard environment
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Figure C.4: Number of proposals to reach stability in Random Singles First
process in balanced random environment
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Figure C.5: Number of proposals to reach stability in Random Singles First
process in almost balanced random environment
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Figure C.6: Number of proposals to reach stability in Random Singles First
process in hard environment
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Figure C.7: Proportion single after multiple of proposal in almost balanced
environment for n = 50.
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Figure C.8: Proportion of single agents after multiple of proposal in
balanced environment for n = 50.
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Figure C.9: Proportion of single agents after multiple of proposal in almost
balanced environment for n = 1000.
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Figure C.10: Average ranks for n men and n+ 1 women after 5n2 proposals.
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Figure C.11: Men’s average rank relative to the WOSM with n men and
n+ 1 women after 5n2 proposals.
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Figure C.12: Total average rank relative to the WOSM with n men and
n+ 1 women after 5n2 proposals.
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Figure C.13: Men’s average rank relative to the WOSM with n men and
1.5n women after 5n2 proposals.
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Figure C.14: Total average rank relative to the WOSM with n men and
1.5n women after 5n2 proposals.
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C.2 Tables
m1 m2 m3 . . . mn−2 mn−1 mn
w1 1 2 3 . . . n− 2 n− 1 n
w2 n 1 2 3 . . . n− 2 n− 1
w3 n− 1 n 1 2 3 . . . n− 2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
wn−1 3 4 5 . . . n 1 2
wn 2 3 4 . . . n− 1 n 1
Table C.1: An instance of hard preferences in balanced markets,
reproduced from Ackermann et al. (2011).
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